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Article 3

EQUITY IN LLC LAW?
MOHSEN MANESH*
ABSTRACT

To what extent does equity play a role in LLC law? To what extent do courts retain the
judicial discretion “to do right and justice” in circumstances in which the LLC statute and
the applicable LLC agreement do not otherwise offer an adequate remedy to an aggrieved
LLC member or manager? Until recently, the answer to these questions was quite clear:
Equity is subordinate to the freedom of contract and the express terms of the agreement
governing an LLC. But the Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in In re Carlisle Etcetera
has upended this basic percept of LLC law and practice. Carlisle suggests that courts need
not sheepishly defer to the express terms of an LLC agreement. Instead, where justice dictates a different result, Carlisle suggests that courts retain the equitable power to apply
fiduciary standards or recognize other equitable rights or duties, despite the statutorily mandated freedom of contract under LLC law. Thus, this Article argues that Carlisle represents
a true paradigm shift. It inverts the long-assumed supremacy of contract over equity in LLC
law. Instead, the freedom of contract must be exercised always in the shadow of equity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
To what extent does equity play a role in limited liability company
(“LLC”) law? To what extent do courts retain the judicial discretion “to
do right and justice” in circumstances in which the LLC statute and

* Associate Professor, University of Oregon School of Law. The Author thanks Lyman
Johnson, Peter Molk, Tom Rutledge, and Park Bramhall as well as the participants at the
2016 National Business Law Scholars Conference at the University of Chicago Law School
for their thoughtful comments to earlier drafts of this Article. The Author is also grateful to
Eleanor Vincent, Derek Berry, Josanne Jeremiah, Eric Boothe, and Nick Peppler for their
productive research assistance on various topics related to this project.
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the applicable LLC agreement do not otherwise offer an adequate remedy to an aggrieved LLC member or manager? 1
This question is particularly relevant in Delaware, which plays an
outsized role in LLC law due to its status as the leading legal haven
for LLCs. 2 Unlike many other states’ statutes, Delaware’s LLC statute
purports to “give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of
contract and to the enforceability of [LLC] agreements.” 3 Exercising
this freedom of contract, LLC parties routinely agree to limit or wholly
eliminate fiduciary duties, 4 the judge-made duties that courts have
traditionally applied to ensure equity in business associations.5 And in
1. See Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 205 (Del. 2008) (“[T]he final object of equity is
to do right and justice.” (quoting 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE, § 60, at 80 (5th ed. 1941))); see also William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court of Chancery—1792-1992, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L.
819, 821 (1993) (“[E]quity is a moral sense of fairness based on conscience.”).
2. As is the case for corporate charters, Delaware is the preeminent choice of law for
large LLCs. See Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, The Naked Fiduciary, 54 ARIZ. L.
REV. 879, 901 (2012) (finding that in a dataset of 150 LLCs in which one or more party is a
public company, over half were organized under and governed by Delaware law); Bruce H.
Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry: Jurisdictional Competition for Limited Liability Companies, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 116 tbl.2 (finding that among closely held
LLCs with 50 or more employees that form outside of their home state, more than 61% are
organized under and governed by Delaware law); Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market
for LLC Law: A Theory of Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 202
(2011) [hereinafter Manesh, Market for LLC Law] (observing that all 15 of LLCs that filed
for or completed an initial public offering during a six-year period ending March 31, 2010
were chartered in Delaware); Jens Dammann & Matthias Schündeln, Where Are Limited
Liability Companies Formed? An Empirical Analysis 3 (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Law and
Econ. Research Paper No. 126, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1633472 [https://perma.cc/ER2M-ZLFF] (finding that among closely held LLCs
with 5000 or more employees that form outside of their home state, more than 95% are organized under and governed by Delaware law); see also Daniel S. Kleinberger, Two Decades

of “Alternative Entities”: From Tax Rationalization Through Alphabet Soup to Contract as
Deity, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 445, 460 (2008) (“ ‘Delaware law seems to exert an

almost gravitation pull’ on LLC practice and jurisprudence.”).
3. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2016).
4. See, e.g., Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 139 (Del. 2008) (LLC agreement eliminating
all liability associated with fiduciary duties, other than for “fraudulent or illegal conduct”);
CNL-AB LLC v. E. Prop. Fund I SPE (MS Ref) LLC, No. 6137–VCP, 2011 WL 353529, at *9
(Del. Ch. Jan. 28, 2011) (LLC agreement permitting the managing member to act in its “sole
and absolute discretion . . . without consideration of any other obligation or duty, fiduciary
or otherwise . . . .”); In re Atlas Energy Res., LLC, No. 4589-VCN, 2010 WL 4273122, at *1213 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010) (LLC agreement explicitly eliminating all fiduciary duties owed
by officers and directors of a publicly traded LLC); Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017–
CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *9 (Del. Ch. May 7, 2008) (LLC agreement eliminating all fiduciary
duties by explicitly limiting the parties’ duties to those “expressly set forth” therein); see also
Peter Molk, How Do LLC Owners Contract Around Default Statutory Protections?, 42 J.
CORP. L. 24, 27 (2016), (providing evidence showing that fiduciary waiver or modification is
common among privately held LLCs).
5. See, e.g., J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, Contractarianism and Its Discontents: Reflections on Unincorporated Business Organization Law Reform, 42 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 493, 505 (2009) (arguing that fiduciary duties enable courts to “police misconduct . . .
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deference to the LLC statute, Delaware courts have found themselves
robotically enforcing these agreements without ever seriously questioning whether such enforcement is fair, reasonable, or just given the
circumstances. 6 Thus, until recently at least, based on statute and
precedent, the role of equity in LLCs seemed clear: Equity is subordinate to the freedom of contract and the express terms of the agreement
governing an LLC.
But the Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC 7 has upended this basic precept of LLC law and practice.
Carlisle suggests that, as a state constitutional matter, Delaware
courts need not sheepishly defer to the state’s LLC statute or the express terms of an LLC agreement. 8 Instead, where justice dictates a
different result, Carlisle suggests that Delaware courts retain the equitable power to apply fiduciary standards or recognize other equitable
rights or duties, despite the statutorily mandated freedom of contract.
Thus, this Article argues, Carlisle represents a true paradigm shift. It
inverts the long-assumed supremacy of contract over equity in LLC
law. Instead, the freedom of contract must always be exercised in the
shadow of equity.9
This Article explores the implications of Carlisle in four Parts. Part
II briefly traces the origins of equity and its role in modern business
associations. As this Part explains, although LLC law embraces fiduciary duties and other principles that originated in equity, Delaware’s
LLC statute and case law also make clear that these equitable principles may be limited or wholly displaced by the terms of an
LLC agreement.
Part III then explores the peculiarly constitutional basis for equity
in Delaware and its implications for freedom of contract in LLCs. Carlisle suggests that, as a state constitutional matter, equity cannot be
subordinated by statute or contract. Yet, there is also a problem with
Carlisle: it squarely conflicts with a previous Delaware Supreme Court
opinion, CML V, LLC v. Bax, decided just four years earlier. 10 Today,
based on broader societal concepts of fairness”); Kleinberger, supra note 2, at 465 (“Fiduciary
duty attaches to [business associations] to proscribe and constrain abuses of power.”).
6. See, e.g., Wood, 953 A.2d at 141-44 (dismissing claims for breach of fiduciary duty
in a publicly held LLC); In re Atlas Energy Res., 2010 WL 4273122, at *12-13 (dismissing
claims for breach of fiduciary duties in a publicly held LLC); Related Westpac LLC v. JER
Snowmass LLC, No. 5001–VCS, 2010 WL 2929708, at *7-8 (Del. Ch. July 23, 2010) (dismissing claim for breach of fiduciary duty in a privately held LLC); Fisk Ventures, 2008 WL
1961156, at *11 (dismissing claims for breach of fiduciary duty in a privately held LLC).
7. 114 A.3d 592 (Del. Ch. 2015).
8. See infra Section III.B.2.
9. Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (demonstrating how the “shadow of the law”
forces parties to take into account what would happen in the event of adjudication by a court).
10. 28 A.3d 1037 (Del. 2011).
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that conflict remains unresolved. Part IV, however, argues that Carlisle signals the demise of Bax and a resurgent role for equity in LLCs.
Recent developments involving both Delaware’s LLC statute and its
judiciary support this conclusion.
Still, Part V contends that even if Carlisle is proven correct, as a
practical matter, equity is unlikely to mount a widespread assault on
the freedom of contract in LLCs. Both policy and pragmatic considerations suggest that the Delaware courts will be exceedingly sparing in
the use of their constitutionally vested equitable powers. Consequently, the express terms of LLC agreements, including fiduciary
waivers, will continue to be routinely enforced in the vast majority of
cases. But what Carlisle means is that the Delaware courts need not
unquestioningly defer to the express language of an LLC agreement in
every conceivable circumstance—especially when presented with conduct that is manifestly opportunistic, exploitative, or otherwise
inequitable. Thus, the practical consequence of equity for LLC law and
governance will be subtle: the very existence of an unwaivable judicial
power “to do right and justice” may serve as a prophylactic deterrent
against brazen overreach or exploitation.
II. EQUITY AND THE FREEDOM OF CONTRACT IN LLCS
The path to Carlisle has its roots in the medieval distinction between law and equity. Section A explores that history and its relevance
to contemporary business associations, in particular the recognition in
equity that those vested with the legal right of control over a business
owe a fiduciary duty to the business and its owners. Section B then
explains how the Delaware Chancery Court has adapted this equitable
principle to LLCs. Finally, Section C describes the apparent subjugation of equity by freedom of contract under Delaware’s LLC statute
and case law.

A. Equity and the Law of Fiduciary Duties
In medieval England, equity arose as a corrective salve to the injustice wrought by the early common law. 11 The early English courts
of law applied a highly technical, inflexible system of substantive law
and procedure. 12 As a result, petitioners with legitimate claims before

11. See POMEROY, supra note 1 §§ 50-51, at 64-65. For a historical perspective on the
origins of equity in medieval England and its Greek and Roman antecedents, see generally
id. §§ 2-39; HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, §§ 1-3 (2d ed.
1948); Howard L. Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 20 FORDHAM L. REV. 23,
26-40 (1951).
12. See POMEROY, supra note 1, at §§ 16-17, at 20-21; Maurice A. Hartnett, III, The
History of the Delaware Court of Chancery, 48 BUS. LAW. 367, 368 (1992).
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these early law courts were often denied justice because of the courts’
rigid adherence to perceived common law precedents or formalistic
technicalities.13 These petitioners would sometimes appeal to the king,
the realm’s ultimate legal authority. 14 As sovereign, the king retained
the royal prerogative to ameliorate any harsh results obtained in his
law courts—to do justice between subjects by recognizing rights and
ordering remedies that were not available in the courts of law.15 Over
time, as the number of these petitions became increasingly burdensome, the king delegated his royal power to do justice first to his
highest royal officer, the Chancellor, and eventually to a full-time
court, known as the court of chancery or court of equity. 16
Consistent with its origins and purposes, courts of equity developed
separate doctrines to provide relief to aggrieved parties where the law
courts did not recognize a legal right or provide for an adequate remedy. 17 These equitable doctrines emphasized flexibility and fairness,
rather than technicalities or formalism, enabling equity courts to exercise discretion to do justice where the facts of a given case so
required. 18 This room for discretion has been famously decried as enabling unpredictable results—that equity is as arbitrary as the size of
the “chancellor’s foot.” 19 But judicial discretion is also at the very heart
of equity jurisprudence. 20 Equity enables a court to take into consideration the special circumstances of a given case in order to do justice

13. See Harnett, supra note 12, at 368.
14. Id.
15. See Oleck, supra note 11, at 33.
16. See MCCLINTOCK, supra note 11, § 1, at 2; POMEROY, supra note 1 §§ 33-35, at 3840; Harnett, supra note 12, at 368; Oleck, supra note 11, at 35-36.
17. See Harnett, supra note 12, at 368 (“[C]hancery restricted itself to hearing only
those cases where other courts could not afford an adequate remedy.”); Quillen & Hanrahan,
supra note 1, at 820 (“[The medieval] Court of Chancery . . . provided judicial relief to those
left remediless because of the procedural rigidity, corruption, and inadequate enforcement
machinery of the common law courts.”).
18. See MCCLINTOCK, supra note 11, § 1, at 2; Harnett, supra note 12, at 368.
19. English law scholar John Selden famously critiqued the unpredictability of discretion in equity:
Equity is a roguish thing: for [in] law we have a measure [and] know what to
trust to; equity is according to the conscience of him that is [the] chancellor, and
as that is larger or narrower, so is equity. ‘Tis . . . as if they should make the
standard for the measure we call a foot, [to be the] chancellor’s foot; what an uncertain measure would this be? One chancellor has a long foot, another a short foot,
[and] a third an indifferent foot: ‘tis the same thing in the chancellor’s conscience.
JOHN SELDEN, THE TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 62-63 (Edinburgh, Thomas Constable & Co. 1854).
20. See MCCLINTOCK, supra note 11, § 23, at 49-52.
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where the strict application to law would otherwise serve injustice. 21
As one former Delaware Chancellor has succinctly described it,
“[E]quity is the recognition that the universal rule cannot always be
justly applied to the special case.”22
The American colonies inherited from the English this bifurcated
system of law and equity. 23 In fact, after the Revolution, many of the
newly independent states continued with separate courts of law and
courts of equity. 24 Today, while most U.S. jurisdictions have merged
the two—empowering courts of general jurisdiction to apply both equitable and legal doctrines 25—a small minority retain separate
equitable courts of chancery, 26 most notably Delaware. 27
Many bedrock principles familiar to contemporary business lawyers
originated in equity. 28 Some examples include the rights of partners to
seek judicial dissolution of a partnership where it has become impracticable to carry on the partnership business; 29 the derivative standing
21. See MCCLINTOCK, supra note 11, § 1, at 2 (defining equity by “the fundamental end
of attaining . . . justice in the particular case, and the means of attaining that end by discretion in adapting the remedy to the particular case”); Oleck, supra note 11, at 38
(“Necessarily, . . . equity, could not effect substantial justice without by-passing precedent
when a situation demanded special treatment.”).
22. Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 1, at 821-22; see also Oleck, supra note 11, at 23
(“Equity is the correction of the . . . law where it is deficient by reason of its universality (i.e.:
its tendency to establish rules without exceptions.”). As Professor Johnson has pointed out,
the idea that the strict application of universal rules may lead to injustice in specific cases
is one that dates back to Aristotle. See Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties,
91 B.U. L. REV. 701, 709 (2011).
23. See MCCLINTOCK, supra note 11, § 5; Harnett, supra note 12, at 368-69 (describing
the English heritage of equity in colonial Delaware); Oleck, supra note 11, at 40-41; Quillen
& Hanrahan, supra note 1, at 822-31 (same). See generally Solon D. Wilson, Courts of Chancery in the American Colonies, in 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 779
(1908) (providing a historical account of the courts of chancery in colonial America).
24. See Oleck, supra note 11, at 41.
25. See POMEROY, supra note 1 § 40, at 45; Oleck, supra note 11, at 42.
26. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, only four states retained separate
courts of law and equity: Arkansas, Delaware, Mississippi, and Tennessee. See John J. Watkins, Law and Equity in Arkansas - Or, Why to Support the Proposed Judicial Article, 53
ARK. L. REV. 401, 404 (2000). Arkansas merged its courts of law and equity in 2001. See ARK.
CONST. amend. 80 § 6(A) (2001).
27. For more on the importance of the Delaware Chancery Court in the business law
context, see Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061 (2000); William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence
of the Delaware Court of Chancery in the State-Federal Joint Venture in Providing Justice,
48 BUS. LAW. 351 (1992); William Savitt, The Genius of the Modern Chancery System, 2012
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 570 (2012).
28. Another common business law doctrine sometimes associated with equity is corporate,
or limited liability, veil piercing. See, e.g., 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 48 (2016). There is,
however, some disagreement among courts as to whether veil piercing is truly an equitable
remedy. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 535 (2001).
29. See, e.g., In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC, 114 A.3d 592, 601 (Del. Ch. 2015) (discussing
the origins of judicial dissolution in equity).
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of shareholders to bring a suit on behalf of a corporation; 30 and, most
importantly, the fiduciary duties owed by trustees, agents, partners,
and corporate directors and officers.31
“The hallmark of a fiduciary relationship is that one person has the
power to exercise control over the property of another as if it were her
own.” 32 Hence, the relationship between a trustee and trust beneficiary, between an agent and her principal, among general partners,
and between corporate officers and directors and the corporation’s
shareholders have all been categorized as fiduciary in nature. 33 In each
instance, “one [party] reposes special trust in and reliance on the judgment of another . . . .” 34 “The relationship connotes a dependence” 35—
a vulnerability that the party vested with control could exercise that

30. See, e.g., Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 201-02 (Del. 2008) (discussing the history
of derivative standing in equity); accord CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 1037, 1044 (Del. 2011)
(quoting Schoon).
31. See Johnson, supra note 22, at 711-13 (describing the origins of fiduciary duty in
equity); L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 69-72 (same); see also
McMahon v. New Castle Assocs., 532 A.2d 601, 604 (Del. Ch. 1987) (Allen, C.) (“Among the
most ancient of headings under which chancery’s jurisdiction falls is that of fiduciary relationships. . . . Chancery takes jurisdiction over ‘fiduciary’ relationships because equity, not
law, is the source of the right asserted.”).
32. Sokol Holdings, Inc. v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, No. 3874–VCS, 2009 WL 2501542,
at *3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 5, 2009) (Strine, V.C.); accord Bond Purchase, L.L.C v. Patriot Tax Credit
Props., L.P., 746 A.2d 842, 864 (Del. Ch. 1999) (Steele, V.C.) (“[A] fiduciary is typically one
who is entrusted with the power to manage and control the property of another.”); Malone v.
Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998) (“An underlying premise for the imposition of fiduciary
duties is a separation of legal control from beneficial ownership. Equitable principles act in
those circumstances to protect the beneficiaries who are not in a position to protect themselves.” (citation omitted)); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary
Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1402 (2002) (“[F]iduciary relationships form when one party
(the ‘fiduciary’) acts on behalf of another party (the ‘beneficiary’) while exercising discretion
with respect to a critical resource belonging to the beneficiary.”); Julian Velasco, Fiduciary
Duties and Fiduciary Outs, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 157, 159 (2013) (“A fiduciary relationship
is a legally recognized relationship in which one is given power over the interests of another,
who thereby becomes vulnerable to abuse.”).
33. See Sokol Holdings, 2009 WL 2501542, at *3 (“[A]rrangements typically giving rise
to fiduciary relationships include trusts, corporations, partnerships, and estates.”);
McMahon v. New Castle Assocs., 532 A.2d 601, 604-05 (Del. Ch. 1987) (“Our law has
acknowledged several [fiduciary] relationships beyond that of express trustee and corporate
officer or director: general partners; administrators or executors; guardians and, in some
instances, joint venturers or principals and their agents.” (citations omitted)); see also In re
USACafes, L.P. Litig., 600 A.2d 43, 48 (Del. Ch. 1991) (Allen, C.) (“The law of trusts represents the earliest and fullest expression of [the fiduciary] principle in our law, but courts of
equity have extended it appropriately to achieve substantial justice in a wide array
of situations.”).
34. Cheese Shop Int’l, Inc. v. Steele, 303 A.2d 689, 690 (Del. Ch. 1973), rev’d on other
grounds, 311 A.2d 870 (Del. 1973).
35. Id.

100

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:93

control carelessly or exploitatively, in their own self-interest.36 To protect against this vulnerability, equity recognizes a fiduciary duty of
care and loyalty owed by those vested with the legal right of control
over the property of another. 37 Applying the fiduciary principle in the
context of business associations, equity ensures that those vested with
legal control of a business do not opportunistically exploit that control
to benefit themselves at the expense of the business or its true owners.38

B. Fiduciary Duties in LLCs
As compared to partnerships and corporations, LLCs are a relatively
new form of business association.39 Indeed, Delaware did not adopt its

36. See Smith, supra note 32, at 1482-83 (explaining that the rationale for fiduciary
duties is to protect the beneficiary from opportunism that arises from the discretionary
power wielded by the fiduciary); Velasco, supra note 32, at 159 (“[T]he raison d’être of fiduciary duties, and of the designation of relationships as fiduciary, is the protection of the
beneficiary from abuse at the hands of the fiduciary.”).
37. As Chancellor Allen has explained,
[T]he principle of fiduciary duty, stated most generally, [is] that one who controls
property of another may not, without implied or express agreement, intentionally use that property in a way that benefits the holder of the control to the
detriment of the property or its beneficial owner. There are, of course, other aspects—a fiduciary may not waste property even if no self interest is involved and
must exercise care even when his heart is pure—but the central aspect of the
relationship is, undoubtedly, fidelity in the control of property for the benefit
of another.

USACafes, 600 A.2d at 48. Elsewhere, Chancellor Allen has also explained the equitable
origins of fiduciary duties:

The classic example—the accountability of trustees—demonstrates the reason
why chancery takes jurisdiction over fiduciaries. The “fiduciary” duty of a trustee
to deal with the trust res only for the benefit of the cestui que trust and not for
his own benefit is a creation of equity. At law a trustee, as the legal owner, may
deal with trust property as his own. The rights of a beneficiary are only recognized in equity. Accordingly, an action predicated upon such rights is properly
maintained in a court of equity and only a court of equity. A similar rationale
underlies Chancery’s traditional jurisdiction over corporate officers and directors. The duties they owe to shareholders with respect to the exercise of their
legal power over corporate property supervene their legal rights.

McMahon, 532 A.2d at 604 (citations omitted).
38. See Crosse v. BCBSD, Inc., 836 A.2d 492, 495 (Del. 2003) (“This Court has held that

‘the concept of a fiduciary relationship . . . applie[s] in legal relationships where the interests
of the fiduciary and the beneficiary incline toward a common goal in which the fiduciary is
required to pursue solely the interests of the beneficiary . . . .’ ” (quoting Corrado Bros. v.
Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 562 A.2d 1188, 1192 (Del.1989))); Sokol Holdings, 2009 WL 2501542,
at *3 (Strine, V.C.) (“The reason Chancery has jurisdiction in such cases is because traditionally only the rights of the legal owner are recognized at law, and equity is left to protect
the rights of the beneficial owner.”).
39. See generally William J. Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Antecedents, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 855 (1995) (providing a historical account of the LLC business
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LLC statute until 199240—well after the equitable doctrine of fiduciary
duty was established in other business contexts. But Delaware’s LLC
statute has always contemplated that “[i]n any case not provided for [by
the statute], the rules of law and equity . . . shall govern.” 41
Accordingly, analogizing to other, more established business
forms, Delaware courts have readily adapted existing equitable principles to LLCs. 42 With respect to fiduciary duties specifically, even
though the Delaware LLC statute does not affirmatively impose such
duties on any party, 43 the chancery court had little trouble recognizing that those vested with control and discretionary power over an
LLC “easily fit[] the definition of a fiduciary” 44 and, therefore, owe
traditional fiduciary duties. 45
form); Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1459 (1998) (same).
40. See Limited Liability Company Act, 68 Del. Laws 1329 (1992) (codified as amended at
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -1109 (2016)); see also Hamill, supra note 39, at 1475-76.
41. § 18-1104.
42. See, e.g., Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 850-51, 855 n.65
(Del. Ch. 2012) (Strine, C.) (analogizing the fiduciary duties owed in the corporate context to
the fiduciary duties owed in a manager-managed LLC); Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d
649, 662 (Del. Ch. 2012) (Laster, V.C.) (analogizing the fiduciary duties owed in the limited
partnership context to the fiduciary duties owed by the managing member of a membermanaged LLC); In re Atlas Energy Res., LLC, No. 4589-VCN, 2010 WL 4273122, at *7-11
(Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010) (Noble, V.C.) (analogizing the fiduciary duties owed by a controlling
shareholder in the corporate context to the fiduciary duties owed by a controlling unitholder
of an LLC); Kelly v. Blum, No. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *11 n.73 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24,
2010) (Parsons, V.C.) (observing in the context of determining the fiduciary duties owed in a
manager-managed LLC that “[m]anger-managed LLCs are, in many ways, analogous to corporations, whereas member-managed LLCs may be more analogous to a partnership”); Bay
Ctr. Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, No. 3658-VCS, 2009 WL 1124451, at
*9 n.43 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009) (Strine, V.C.) (observing in the context of determining the
fiduciary duties owed by the managing member of a member-managed LLC that “in the absence of developed LLC case law, this court has often decided LLC cases by looking to
analogous provisions in limited partnership law”); Haley v. Talcott, 864 A.2d 86, 94 (Del. Ch.
2004) (Strine, C.) (analogizing judicial dissolution under DGCL 273 in the corporate context
to judicial dissolution of an LLC). See generally Obeid v. Hogan, No. 11900–VCL, 2016 WL
3356851, at *5-6 (Del. Ch. June 10, 2016) (discussing the judicial practice and propriety of
analogizing LLCs to general and limited partnerships and to corporations).
43. Auriga, 40 A.3d at 849 (“The Delaware LLC Act does not plainly state that the traditional fiduciary duties . . . apply by default as to managers or members of a [LLC].”); see
also ROBERT L. SYMONDS, JR. & MATTHEW J. O’TOOLE, SYMONDS & O’TOOLE ON DELAWARE
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 9.04[B][3] (2d ed. 2015) (The statute leaves “such matters
[i.e. fiduciary duties] to [the] development in the Delaware case law.”).
44. Auriga, 40 A.3d at 850; accord id. at 854 (“[M]anagers of LLCs easily qualify as
fiduciaries under traditional and settled principles of equity . . . .”); see also Feeley, 62 A.3d
at 661 (Laster, V.C.) (“The managing member of an LLC ‘is vested with discretionary power
to manage the business of the LLC’ and ‘easily fits the definition of a fiduciary.’ ” (quoting
Auriga, 40 A.3d at 850-51)).
45. See, e.g., Auriga, 40 A.3d at 851 (Strine, C.) (“[B]ecause the LLC Act provides for
principles of equity to apply, because LLC managers are clearly fiduciaries, and because
fiduciaries owe the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, the LLC Act starts with the default

102

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:93

As Delaware Chief Justice Strine explained in Auriga Capital v.

Gatz Properties,46 sitting then as the Chancellor:

It seems obvious that, under traditional principles of equity, a manager of an LLC would qualify as a fiduciary . . . [.] “[A] fiduciary
relationship is a situation where one person reposes special trust in
and reliance on the judgment of another or where a special duty exists on the part of one person to protect the interests of another.”
Corporate directors, general partners and trustees are analogous
examples of those who . . . owe a “special duty.” Equity distinguishes
fiduciary relationships from straightforward commercial arrangements where there is no expectation that one party will act in the
interests of the other. . . . The manager of an LLC has more than an
arms-length, contractual relationship with the members of the LLC.
Rather, the manager is vested with discretionary power to manage
the business of the LLC. 47

Therefore, the then-chancellor concluded, “because LLC managers are
clearly fiduciaries, . . . the LLC Act starts with the default that managers of LLCs owe enforceable fiduciary duties.” 48

C. Freedom of Contract and the Limits on Equity
Although Delaware law has imported traditional equitable principles, including fiduciary duties, into the LLC context, Delaware’s LLC
statute also makes clear that those equitable principles are subordinate to the “freedom of contract and to the enforceability of [LLC]

that managers of LLCs owe enforceable fiduciary duties.”); Feeley, 62 A.3d at 661 (Laster,
V.C.) (“[The] Delaware [LLC Act] contemplates that equitable fiduciary duties will apply by
default to a manager or managing member of a Delaware LLC.”); Phillips v. Hove, No. 3644–
VCL, 2011 WL 4404034, at *24 (Del. Ch. Sept. 22, 2011) (Laster, V.C.) (“Unless limited or
eliminated in the entity’s operating agreement, the member-managers of a Delaware [LLC]
owe traditional fiduciary duties to the LLC and its members.”); Atlas Energy, 2010 WL
4273122, at *6 (Noble, V.C.) (“[I]n the absence of explicit provisions in a [LLC] agreement to
the contrary, the traditional fiduciary duties owed by corporate directors and controlling
shareholders apply in the [LLC] context.”); Kelly, 2010 WL 629850, at *10 (Parsons, V.C.)
(“[U]nless the LLC agreement in a manager-managed LLC explicitly expands, restricts, or
eliminates traditional fiduciary duties, managers owe those duties to the LLC and its members and controlling members owe those duties to minority members.”); Bay Ctr., 2009 WL
1124451, at *8 (Strine, V.C.) (holding that “in the absence of a contrary provision in the LLC
agreement, the manager of an LLC owes the traditional fiduciary duties of loyalty and care
to the members of the LLC”).
46. Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 849 (Del. Ch. 2012), aff’d
sub nom. Gatz Props., LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012).
47. Id. at 850-51 (footnote omitted); accord id. at 855-56 n.65 (“[M]anagers of LLCs owe
fiduciary duties because they fit within the classic definition of a fiduciary of a business
enterprise under traditional principles of equity.”); see also Feeley, 62 A.3d at 661-63 (Laster,
V.C.) (holding that those who have discretionary power and control over an LLC owe traditional fiduciary duties in the absence of an agreement to the contrary).
48. Auriga, 40 A.3d at 851.
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agreements.” 49 This freedom of contract includes the freedom to privately order all aspects of an LLC’s internal governance,50 including
the fiduciary duties that might otherwise apply to those vested with
control over the business. 51 To emphasize this point, the LLC statute
provides that:
To the extent that, at law or in equity, a member or manager or
other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a [LLC] or to
another member . . . , the member’s or manager’s or other person’s
duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in
the [LLC] agreement . . . . 52

Thus, while fiduciary duties are generally mandatory under corporate
law—a corporate charter cannot eliminate the fiduciary duties of its
officers and directors 53—these duties are simply default rules for

49. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2016).
50. See Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 290 (Del. 1999) (“The [LLC]
Act can be characterized as a ‘flexible statute’ because it generally permits members to engage in private ordering with substantial freedom of contract to govern their
relationship . . . .” (quoting 1 JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS, § 1.12, at 1.37-.38 (1999))).
51. See Manesh, Market for LLC Law, supra note 2, at 225-34 (discussing the freedom
of contract permitted under LLC law regarding fiduciary duties).
52. § 18-1101(c) (emphasis added).
53. As I have elaborated elsewhere:
At most, corporations may eliminate managerial liability arising from breaches
of the fiduciary duty of care and carve out limited exceptions to the corporate
opportunity doctrine. Corporations cannot eliminate the substantive obligations
of the fiduciary duty of care; cannot eliminate the substantive obligations of the
fiduciary duty of loyalty or any liability arising from the breach of that duty;
cannot eliminate the corporate opportunity doctrine altogether; cannot insulate
all interested transactions from exacting entire fairness review; cannot eliminate
so-called Revlon duties; and cannot protect managerial decisions from judicial
scrutiny under the intermediate Unocal standard of review. Delaware alternative entities [including LLCs], however, can do all of these things.
Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity Law: Evidence
from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555, 561-62 (2012) [hereinafter Manesh,
Contractual Freedom] (footnotes omitted); see also Mohsen Manesh, Legal Asymmetry and
the End of Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 465 (2009) [hereinafter Manesh, Legal Asymmetry] (questioning this dichotomy in corporate versus alternative entity law in the context
of publicly traded LLCs and limited partnerships).
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LLCs. 54 Fiduciary duties will apply only in the absence of terms in an
LLC agreement modifying or eliminating such duties.55
This freedom of contract extends not only to fiduciary duties, but
also to other equitable principles that would ordinarily apply to LLCs.
For example, Delaware’s LLC statute recognizes the standing of LLC
members to bring a derivative suit on behalf of an LLC,56 but the Delaware Supreme Court has held that the statutorily mandated freedom
of contract includes the freedom to eliminate the derivative standing
of members.57 Likewise, although the Delaware LLC statute recognizes the right of LLC members to seek judicial dissolution “whenever
it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business” of the LLC,58
the chancery court has held that this right to judicial dissolution may
be waived in the terms of an LLC agreement. 59
As a consequence, Delaware LLC law enables parties to draft agreements that substantially constrain the role of equity in LLCs. In this
respect, Delaware LLC law stands in stark contrast to not only its corporate law, 60 but also the LLC law of other states, in particular those
that have adopted the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act

54. See, e.g., Kelly v. Blum, No. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *11 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24,
2010) (noting that while Delaware’s corporate statute “authorizes a corporation to adopt provisions limiting liability for a director’s breach of the duty of care, [Delaware’s LLC statute]
goes further by allowing broad exculpation of all liabilities for breach of fiduciary duties—
including the duty of loyalty” (footnote omitted)); Sutherland v. Sutherland, No. 2399-VCL,
2009 WL 857468, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2009) (noting that “[w]hile such a provision [limiting the fiduciary duty of loyalty] is permissible under the Delaware [LLC] Act and the
Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, where freedom of contract is the guiding and overriding principle, it is expressly forbidden by the [Delaware corporate statute]”).
55. See Manesh, Contractual Freedom, supra note 53, at 568-69 (describing how an
LLC or limited partnership agreement may eliminate fiduciary duties wholesale or modify
only limited aspects of fiduciary duties by including terms inconsistent with the application
of such duties); see also cases cited supra note 45 (holding that fiduciary duties apply as a
default in LLCs in the absence of provisions in an LLC agreement to the contrary).
56. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1001 (2016).
57. See Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 295 (Del. 1999) (“We hold
that, because the policy of the Act is to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom
of contract and to the enforceability of LLC agreements, the parties may contract to avoid
the applicability of Section[] . . . 18-1001[which codifies the derivative standing of
LLC members].”).
58. See § 18-802.
59. See R & R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, No. 3803-CC, 2008
WL 3846318, at *4-6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008).
60. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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(ULLCA) 61 or the increasingly popular Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (RULLCA).62 Under both the ULLCA and
RULLCA, the ability of parties to contractually tailor fiduciary duties
is statutorily limited.63 Generally, an LLC agreement under either uniform statute cannot lawfully place “manifestly unreasonable”
restrictions on the fiduciary duty of loyalty or care. 64 Indeed, the uniform LLC statutes identify a number of mandatory provisions that
cannot be eliminated by the terms of an LLC agreement. 65 These mandatory provisions include the rights of LLC members to bring a
derivative lawsuit on behalf of the LLC, 66 as well as the right to seek
judicial dissolution. 67
As result of these statutory differences, courts in jurisdictions governed by statutes following the ULLCA or RULLCA retain significant
equitable discretion to ensure fairness and justice in LLC cases
through the application of the uniform statutes’ mandatory standards
like “manifestly unreasonable.” 68 By contrast, in Delaware, where an
LLC agreement waives or displaces traditional equitable principles,
the courts have found themselves robotically enforcing the terms of the
agreement, without ever seriously questioning whether such enforcement is fair, reasonable, or just given the circumstances presented.69
Perhaps nowhere is this contrast more vivid than in cases involving
alleged breaches of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. Where those vested
61. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1996) [hereinafter ULLCA],
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/limited%20liability%20company/ullca96.pdf
[http://perma.cc/27TP-2ATY].
62. R EVISED U NIF. L TD. L IAB . CO. A CT (U NIF. L AW C OMM ’ N 2006) [hereinafter
RULLCA], http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/limited%20liability%20company/
ullca_final_06rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8H6-DK8C].
63. See ULLCA § 103(b)(2)-(3); RULLCA § 110(d).
64. The ULLCA actually treats the two fiduciary duties slightly differently. Under the
ULLCA, LLC agreements cannot place “manifestly unreasonable” restrictions on the fiduciary duty of loyalty or “unreasonably reduce” the fiduciary duty of care. See
ULLCA § 103(b)(2) (addressing loyalty); id. § 103(b)(3) (addressing care). The RULLCA addresses both fiduciary duties with the same legal standard. The RULLCA provides LLC
agreements cannot impose “manifestly unreasonable” limitations on either fiduciary duty of
loyalty or care. See RULLCA § 110(d); see also Mark J. Loewenstein, Fiduciary Duties and
Unincorporated Business Entities: In Defense of the “Manifestly Unreasonable” Standard,
41 TULSA L. REV. 411, 431-34 (2006) (explaining the “manifestly unreasonable” standard).
65. See ULLCA § 103(b); RULLCA § 110(c).
66. See RULLCA § 110(c)(9). The ULLCA does not have a similar provision. See
ULLCA § 103(b).
67. See ULLCA § 103(b)(6); RULLCA § 110(c)(7).
68. See Loewenstein, supra note 64, at 440 (conceding that the “manifestly unreasonable” standard “is indeed uncertain, ambiguous, nebulous, and . . . [lacks] clearly defined
limits”). Other mandatory provisions of the uniform LLC statutes likewise reserve room for
the exercise of a court’s equitable discretion, including the standards of “oppressive” or “not
reasonably practicable to carry on” the LLC’s business, either of which may serve as a basis
for triggering judicial dissolution. See RULLCA §§ 110(c)(7), 701(a)(4)-(5).
69. See supra note 6.
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with legal control over the LLC have engaged in bad faith conduct or
self-dealing at the expense of the business or its owners, Delaware’s
LLC statute and case law suggest that, in deference to the freedom of
contract, the courts are powerless to do equity in the face of an LLC
agreement waiving or displacing traditional fiduciary duties. It is this
basic understanding of LLC law—the supremacy of contract over equity—that Carlisle subverts.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR EQUITY
Despite Delaware’s unequivocal embrace of freedom of contract in
statute and case law, the role of equity in LLCs is not as settled as it
might seem. Lurking in Delaware’s state constitution, there is a strong
argument to be made that courts are not left powerless to do equity,
even when presented with an LLC agreement that purports to eliminate fiduciary duties or curb other traditionally equitable principles.
Section A explains this argument. And Section B describes how the
Delaware courts have responded to it. As Section B explains, the Delaware courts have now twice addressed the constitutional basis for
equity in LLCs. But those two cases—Bax and Carlisle—reached opposite conclusions on the constitutional issue. Consequently, today,
the role of equity in LLC law remains unsettled.

A. Equity Jurisdiction Under the Delaware Constitution
The constitutional case for equity in LLCs was first voiced in a 2011
article by Professor Lyman Johnson. 70 In short, Johnson argued the
Delaware Chancery Court’s equitable powers are constitutionally protected and, therefore, cannot be reduced by legislative statute or
private agreement. 71
Johnson’s argument is based on the Delaware Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article IV, Section 10 of the state’s current
constitution. 72 That section provides, in relevant part, that the Delaware Chancery Court “shall have all the jurisdiction and powers
vested by the laws of this State in the Court of Chancery.” 73 This language traces its origins back to the Delaware Constitution of 1792,
which was the first time the state constitutionalized the jurisdiction of
its chancery court. 74 Interpreting this language in light of its complex
history, the Delaware Supreme Court held in DuPont v. DuPont that

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See generally Johnson, supra note 22, at 701-03.
See id. at 702-03.
See id. at 716-18; see also DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 10.

See Dupont v. Dupont, 85 A.2d 724, 728 (Del. 1951).
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the state constitution vests the Delaware Chancery Court with equitable jurisdiction equivalent to that of the High Court of Chancery in
Great Britain at the time of the separation of the American colonies.75
More importantly, the supreme court also held that the state legislature is constitutionally prohibited from restricting the chancery court’s
equity jurisdiction to less than this “irreducible minimum” as first set
in 1792. 76
But, as Johnson argues, Delaware’s LLC statute purports to do just
that. 77 The doctrine of fiduciary duty was well established in equity at
the time of this nation’s founding.78 Therefore, Johnson concludes, “under the reasoning of DuPont, the [Delaware] Chancery Court’s
jurisdiction over fiduciary duty claims [can]not be divested through legislation enacted by the Delaware General Assembly.” 79 To be sure,
Delaware’s LLC statute does not directly purport to divest the chancery
court’s equity jurisdiction to recognize and enforce fiduciary claims. But
it does so indirectly. By purporting to authorize contractual restrictions
or elimination of fiduciary duties,80 the state legislature attempts to empower private individuals to do what the legislature cannot do directly.81
“In effect, the General Assembly is aggrandizing to itself, and private
parties, the power to decide what the Delaware judiciary can and cannot
do” with respect to fiduciary relationships.82
75. See id. at 728-30; see also Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 1, at 849 (summarizing
the holding of Dupont).
76. See Dupont, 85 A.2d at 729 (holding that “the general equity jurisdiction of the
Court of Chancery is measured in terms of the general equity jurisdiction of the High Court
of Chancery of Great Britain and is a constitutional grant not subject to legislative curtailment . . . .”); id. (interpreting the state constitution “to establish . . . the irreducible minimum
of the judiciary. . . . [,] secur[ing] for the protection of the people an adequate judicial system
and remov[ing] it from the vagaries of legislative whim”); accord CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d
1037, 1044 (Del. 2011) (“The Delaware Constitution prohibits the General Assembly from
limiting the equity jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery to less than the general equity jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery of Great Britain existing at the time of our
separation from the Mother Country.” (citing Dupont, 85 A.2d 724)); In re Carlisle Etcetera
LLC, 114 A.3d 592, 602 (Del. Ch. 2015) (paraphrasing Dupont’s holding that the state constitution “vested in the Court of Chancery ‘all the general equity jurisdiction of the High
Court of Chancery of Great Britain as it existed prior to the separation of the colonies . . . .’
[and that] the General Assembly cannot enact legislation that reduces this court’s jurisdiction below the constitutionally established minimum . . . .” (quoting DuPont, 85 A.2d at 727)).
77. See Johnson, supra note 22, at 711-18.
78. See id. at 711-12, 718 (citing Charitable Corp. v. Sutton (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (Ch.)).
79. Id. at 718 (footnote omitted).
80. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2016).
81. See Johnson, supra note 22, at 713-14. To be sure, there is nothing to suggest that
in enacting this provision of the LLC statute, the Delaware General Assembly understood
and intended to circumvent the constitutional limits on its legislative power. Rather, in enacting the provision, the General Assembly appears to have unknowingly superseded its
constitutional authority regarding equity jurisdiction.
82. Id. at 714.
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The upshot of Johnson’s analysis is that, despite Delaware’s embrace of freedom of contract, as a constitutional matter, Delaware
courts retain their traditional equitable power to recognize fiduciary
relationships and impose fiduciary standards. 83 That power means
that Delaware courts need not blithely defer to terms in an LLC agreement purporting to limit or eliminate fiduciary duties. 84 Instead, the
chancery court must, in each case, ascertain, as an equitable matter,
whether to enforce the terms of an LLC agreement given the circumstances with which it is presented.85
Although Johnson’s article centers on the enforceability of fiduciary
waivers, 86 his analysis has the same force anytime the LLC statute or
an agreement purports to limit or eliminate a facet of the chancery
court’s traditional equitable powers. So, it is interesting that in the two
LLC cases where the Delaware courts have addressed the scope of the
chancery court’s constitutionally protected equity jurisdiction, the
courts were focused on other, non-fiduciary facets of that jurisdiction:
derivative standing and judicial dissolution.

B. Divergent Judicial Views
Prior to the publication of Johnson’s 2011 article, no Delaware court
had ever considered the implications of the chancery court’s constitutionally protected equity jurisdiction as applied to LLCs—presumably
because no litigant had previously raised the issue. But immediately
after his article’s publication, the plaintiff in CML V, LLC v. Bax87
made the constitutional argument for the first time on appeal before
the Delaware Supreme Court. 88

1. Bax
In Bax, the Delaware Supreme Court was faced with a narrow legal
question: whether the state’s LLC statute precludes derivative standing for an LLC creditor. The plaintiff in Bax, a junior secured creditor
of an insolvent LLC, sought to bring a derivative suit on behalf of the
83. See id. at 718.
84. See id. at 718-19.
85. See id. (arguing that, despite the authorization of fiduciary waivers in the LLC statute, the chancery court retains the “continuing responsibility to ask—in every case—
whether, in equity, [the court] should or should not enforce the contractual waiver”).
86. Although Johnson limits the scope of his analysis to fiduciary waivers, he does apply
it beyond the specific context of LLCs to include fiduciary waivers in general partnership
and limited partnership agreements. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 22, at 706-07, 719.
87. 28 A.3d 1037 (Del. 2011).
88. At the chancery court, the plaintiff did not raise, and the court did not consider, the
potential constitutional issue implicated by the derivative standing provision in the LLC
statute. See CML V, LLC v. Bax, 6 A.3d 238 (Del. Ch. 2010).
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LLC against the LLC’s officers for breaching their fiduciary duties
owed to the LLC.89 As a result of these breaches, the plaintiff-creditor
asserted, the LLC was forced into liquidation and, ultimately, failed to
repay the debt owed to the plaintiff.90
The defendant-officers sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s derivative
claims, arguing that the plaintiff-creditor lacked standing under Delaware’s LLC statute to bring a lawsuit on behalf of the LLC.91
Specifically, the LLC statute provides that in a derivative action, “the
plaintiff must be a member or an assignee of a [LLC] interest at the
time of bringing the action.” 92 This statutory language, the defendants
contended, precluded the court from recognizing derivative standing
for any other parties, including LLC creditors like the plaintiff. 93
The plaintiff countered that such a literal interpretation of the LLC
statute—limiting derivative standing exclusively to LLC members and
assignees—would render the statute unconstitutional under the state
constitution because the statute would divest the chancery court of its
traditional equitable power to recognize derivative standing for other
parties where justice required it. 94 To make this point, the plaintiffcreditor pointed to Delaware corporate law precedent. 95 Delaware’s
corporate statute recognizes the right of only stockholders to bring a
“derivative suit”;96 yet Delaware courts have also extended derivative
standing to non-stockholder creditors when a corporation becomes insolvent. 97 This right of non-stockholder creditors to bring a derivative
action stems not from any provision in Delaware’s corporate statute,
but from the courts’ equitable power. As the Delaware Supreme Court
explained in a decision prior to Bax, a “corporation’s insolvency ‘makes
the creditors the principal constituency injured by any fiduciary
breaches that diminish the firm’s value.’ Therefore, equitable considerations give creditors standing to pursue derivative claims against
the directors of an insolvent corporation” to prevent failures
of justice. 98
89. See Bax, 28 A.3d at 1039-40.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 1040.
92. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1002 (2016) (emphasis added).
93. See Bax, 28 A.3d at 1040.
94. See id. at 1043-44.
95. See id. at 1042.
96. tit. 8, § 327 (2016).
97. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101
(Del. 2007) (“[T]he creditors of an insolvent corporation have standing to maintain derivative
claims against directors on behalf of the corporation for breaches of fiduciary duties.”).
98. Id. at 101-02 (quoting Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 794
n.67 (Del. Ch. 2004)).
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In Bax, however, the Delaware Supreme Court sidestepped any potential constitutional problem by rejecting the notion that equity plays
a similar role in the LLC context. 99 To support this conclusion, the high
court sharply distinguished LLCs from corporations. The court
acknowledged that at the time of this nation’s independence, the equitable right of a corporation’s stockholders to bring a derivative lawsuit
on behalf of a corporation was recognized by equity in order to prevent
failures of justice. 100 And because derivative standing is itself an equitable doctrine, the court agreed that the doctrine may be extended as
equity requires to address new circumstances, 101 as was the case involving the creditors of an insolvent corporation. 102 Therefore, the
court conceded, citing Dupont, “the Delaware Constitution prohibits
the General Assembly from limiting the Court of Chancery’s jurisdiction over the extension of corporate derivative standing.” 103
Importantly, however, the court observed, the plaintiff’s claim involved an LLC, not a corporation. Unlike corporations, LLCs did not
exist at the time of the American colonies’ separation from Britain.104
“The corporate form existed in 1792, but LLCs came into existence in
Delaware in 1992” when Delaware first adopted its LLC statute.105
Therefore, the court ruled, LLCs fall outside of the chancery court’s
constitutionally vested equity jurisdiction.106 As a result, any rights,
remedies, or obligations associated with LLCs, including the right of
derivative standing asserted by the plaintiff, must arise not in equity,
but from the LLC statute or the agreement governing the LLC.107
By placing LLCs beyond the chancery court’s equitable powers, Bax
avoided any potential constitutional issues raised by the LLC statute.
Because LLCs did not exist at the time of this nation’s founding, “nothing in the Delaware Constitution precludes the General Assembly
from limiting the scope of LLC derivative standing.” 108 Less than four
99. See Bax, 28 A.3d at 1044-46.
100. See id. at 1044; see also Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 201 (Del. 2008) (discussing
the history of derivative standing in equity).
101. See Bax, 28 A.3d at 1044.
102. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
103. See Bax, 28 A.3d at 1045.
104. See id. (“[T]his case deals not with a corporation but with a statutorily created
LLC—a business entity that did not exist in 1792.”).
105. Id.
106. See id. (holding that because LLCs are “a business entity that did not exist in
1792[,] . . . nothing in the Delaware Constitution precludes the General Assembly from limiting the scope of [the equitable doctrine of] . . . derivative standing” in LLCs).
107. See id. (“[W]hen adjudicating the rights, remedies, and obligations associated with
Delaware LLCs, courts must look to the LLC Act because it is only the statute that creates
those rights, remedies, and obligations.” (emphasis added)).
108. Id.
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years later, the chancery court in In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC reached
a starkly different conclusion on the constitutional question.

2. Carlisle
As in Bax, the court in Carlisle faced a relatively narrow legal
question: whether the state’s LLC statute precludes a non-member assignee of an LLC interest from seeking judicial dissolution of an LLC.
In Carlisle, the assignee of an LLC interest had petitioned the court
for judicial dissolution of the LLC, alleging the LLC’s “board of directors,” who collectively acted as the LLC’s manager, were irresolvably
deadlocked on all key decisions. 109 Initially formed as a two-member
LLC, one of the two members had since assigned its LLC interest to a
wholly-owned subsidiary. 110 As a result of that assignment, the assignor lost its status as a member. 111 More consequentially, because
the assignee-subsidiary was never admitted as a member by formal
action of the remaining LLC member in the manner dictated by statute, 112 the subsidiary became a mere assignee of an LLC interest and
not a member. 113
As noted previously, 114 Delaware’s LLC statute explicitly authorizes
the judicial dissolution of an LLC upon irresolvable deadlock “whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business [of the
LLC] in conformity with a [LLC] agreement.” 115 Importantly, however,
judicial dissolution is only permitted under the statute “[o]n application by or for a member or manager.” 116 Seizing on this statutory
language, the sole remaining LLC member sought to dismiss the petition for judicial dissolution, arguing that the petition was brought by
an assignee and not “a member or manager” as statutorily required.117
The chancery court, per Vice Chancellor Laster, agreed with the
LLC’s sole remaining member that the assignee could not petition for
judicial dissolution under the LLC statutory text. 118 Nonetheless, the
109. See In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC, 114 A.3d 592, 594 (Del. Ch. 2015).
110. See id. at 594-96.
111. See id. at 598; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-702(b)(3) (2016) (“A member
ceases to be a member and to have the power to exercise any rights or powers of a member
upon assignment of all of the member’s [LLC] interest.”).
112. § 18-702(a) (“The assignee of a member’s [LLC] interest shall have no right to participate in the management of the business and affairs of a [LLC] except . . . upon the vote
or consent of all of the members of the [LLC].”).
113. See Carlisle, 114 A.3d at 598-601.
114. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
115. § 18-802.
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. Carlisle, 114 A.3d at 597.
118. Id. at 601.
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vice chancellor ruled the assignee could seek judicial dissolution as an
equitable matter.119
To support this conclusion, the vice chancellor began by observing
that the judicial power to order dissolution of a solvent business is itself a power that originated in equity. 120 Therefore, the vice chancellor
reasoned, as a constitutional matter, the LLC statute cannot limit the
court’s traditional equitable power to order dissolution in circumstances where justice dictated.121 If the LLC statute were interpreted
otherwise, to “provide the exclusive method of dissolving an LLC,”
then it “would raise serious constitutional questions” because the statute would unconstitutionally “divest this court of a significant aspect
of its traditional equitable jurisdiction.” 122
By holding that the court’s constitutionally vested equitable power
to order dissolution extends to LLCs, the vice chancellor recognized
the tension created with Bax.123 After all, in Bax, the supreme court
asserted that LLCs are not subject to the chancery’s traditional equitable powers. 124 Under Bax, the only rights of an LLC party are those
that arise under the LLC statute or governing contract, not in equity. 125 To address that tension, the vice chancellor baldly refuted what
he described as Bax’s “radical form of constitutional originalism” 126:
Although this court’s equitable jurisdiction is measured by the “the
general equity jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery of Great
Britain as it existed prior to the separation of the colonies,” the Delaware Supreme Court has [in decisions prior to Bax] recognized that
the scope of that jurisdiction is not limited by the extent of British

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 602 (“If [the LLC statutory provision] did purport to establish an exclusive
means to obtain dissolution and override a significant portion of this court’s traditional equitable jurisdiction, then the validity of that aspect of the provision would raise serious
constitutional questions.”).
122. Id. at 601-02; see also Jason C. Jowers & Meghan A. Adams, The Increasing Role of
Equity in Delaware LLC Litigation, 2015 BUS. L. TODAY 1, 3 (“According to the court [in
Carlisle], if [the LLC statute] could be interpreted to be the exclusive method of judicial
dissolution, it would likely violate the Delaware Constitution.”).
123. See Carlisle, 114 A.3d at 603 n.3 (citing Bax as conflicting precedent).
124. See CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 1037, 1045 (Del. 2011) (holding that because LLCs
are “a business entity that did not exist in 1792[,] . . . nothing in the Delaware Constitution
precludes the General Assembly from limiting the scope of LLC derivative standing”).
125. See id. (“[W]hen adjudicating the rights, remedies, and obligations associated with
Delaware LLCs, courts must look to the LLC Act because it is only the statute that creates
those rights, remedies, and obligations.” (emphasis added)).
126. Carlisle, 114 A.3d at 603 n.3 (“Excluding LLCs and other post-eighteenth century
entities from the domain of equity based on when the governing statutes were adopted would
represent a radical form of constitutional originalism that even the strongest judicial proponents of that doctrine have not embraced.”).
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scientific, technological, and legal knowledge at the time of the
handover.
....
It is the “complete system” of equity that this court inherited and
administers, not the temporally specific subject matter of eighteenth century cases. 127

Given these considerations, the vice chancellor concluded: “I cannot
accept the contention that because the nascent practice of entity law
as it existed at the time of the colonies’ separation had not yet envisioned LLCs, they fall outside the domain of equity.” 128

3. Irreconcilable Conflict Between Bax and Carlisle
Both Bax and Carlisle agree on Dupont’s basic interpretation of the
state constitution: The chancery court’s equitable powers are constitutionally vested and cannot be legislatively reduced to less than what
those powers were in 1792. 129 Where the two cases diverge, however,
is on the question of whether the constitutionally vested jurisdiction
to apply equitable doctrines extends to LLCs and other business forms
not yet in existence in 1792. 130
This divergence is critical. If Carlisle is correct that the chancery
court’s equity jurisdiction extends to newer business forms, then the
Delaware state constitution has far-reaching implications for LLCs.
Under the state’s constitution, the chancery court’s traditional equitable powers—including the power to grant derivative standing, order
dissolution, or to recognize fiduciary relationships and enforce fiduciary duties—cannot be limited by the LLC statute or a private

127. Id. at 602 (internal citations omitted).
128. Id. at 603.
129. See Dupont v. Dupont, 85 A.2d 724, 729 (Del. 1951); accord Bax, 28 A.3d at 1044
(Del. 2011) (“The Delaware Constitution prohibits the General Assembly from limiting the
equity jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery to less than the general equity jurisdiction of the
High Court of Chancery of Great Britain existing at the time of our separation from the
Mother Country.”(citing Dupont, 85 A.2d at 729)); Carlisle, 114 A.3d at 602 (paraphrasing
Dupont’s holding to be that the state constitution “vested in the Court of Chancery ‘all the
general equity jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery of Great Britain as it existed prior
to the separation of the colonies . . .’ [and] that the General Assembly cannot enact legislation
that reduces this court’s jurisdiction below the constitutionally established minimum”).
130. Compare Bax, 28 A.3d at 1045 (holding that because LLCs are “a business entity
that did not exist in 1792[,] . . . nothing in the Delaware Constitution precludes the General
Assembly from limiting the scope of [the equitable doctrine of] derivative standing” in LLCs),
with Carlisle, 114 A.3d at 603 (“I cannot accept the contention that because the nascent
practice of entity law as it existed at the time of the colonies’ separation had not yet envisioned LLCs, they fall outside the domain of equity.”).
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agreement authorized by that statute. 131 Bax avoids these difficult issues by holding that the chancery court’s traditional equitable powers,
vested since 1792, are simply frozen in time, inapplicable to LLCs and
other newer business entities not yet conceived at the time of this
nation’s founding.132
Understandably, one might be tempted to distinguish Carlisle from
Bax, in order to avoid the difficult constitutional issues that Carlisle
raises. But as to the core constitutional question, such attempts are
unavailing. For example, one might attempt to reconcile Carlisle with
Bax by distinguishing the specific statutory provisions at issue in each
case. The relevant statutory provision in Bax was unambiguous that
in a derivative action “the plaintiff must be a member or an assignee.” 133 As the high court noted, the word “must” is “mandatory and
exclusive,” and therefore, the statutory language is “clear [and] unequivocal.” 134 In contrast, the relevant statutory provision in Carlisle—
authorizing judicial dissolution “[o]n application by or for a member or
manager” 135—did not purport to be exclusive, leaving room for the
court to supplement the statute with equitable rights and remedies.136
But the problem with distinguishing Carlisle from Bax based on the
statutory language at issue in each case is that the statutory language
ignores the underlying constitutional question. The underlying constitutional question is whether the chancery court’s equitable powers
vested in 1792 apply to LLCs. If so, then the state constitution precludes any legislative attempt to abridge the chancery court’s
jurisdiction to apply and enforce traditional equitable principles in
LLC cases. Carlisle and Bax come to conflicting conclusions on this
basic question.137 The relative ambiguity or indefiniteness of the statutory provision has no relevance to the constitutional question. 138
For similar reasons, one cannot distinguish Carlisle from Bax by
pointing to the relative equitable considerations implicated in each case,
131. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
132. See Bax, 28 A.3d at 1045 (holding that because LLCs are “a business entity that did
not exist in 1792[,] . . . nothing in the Delaware Constitution precludes the General Assembly
from limiting the scope of LLC derivative standing”).
133. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1002 (2016) (emphasis added).
134. Bax, 28 A.3d at 1041-42.
135. § 18-802.
136. See In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC, 114 A.3d 592, 601 (Del. Ch. 2015) (“Section 18–802
does not state that it establishes an exclusive means to obtain dissolution, nor does it contain
language overriding this court’s equitable authority.”).
137. See supra note 130.
138. For this reason, the Delaware Supreme Court’s assertion in Bax that the chancery
court’s constitutionally vested “equitable power cannot override the LLC Act’s express provisions” is illogical. Bax, 28 A.3d at 1045-46. If the power is one that is constitutionally protected,
then it cannot be legislatively or contractually abrogated.
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as Vice Chancellor Laster attempted to do. 139 In his Carlisle opinion,
the vice chancellor noted that unlike the LLC creditor in Bax, who had
ample adequate remedies at law and therefore did not deserve the protection of equity, the assignee of an LLC interest in Carlisle was left
powerless at law to affect change in the LLC.140 This point is relevant
because, even if LLCs are subject to the chancery court’s equity jurisdiction, it is axiomatic that equity will not intervene where there exists an
adequate legal remedy.141 But the question of whether there exists an
adequate legal remedy in any given case is separate and distinct from
the underlying constitutional question of whether the chancery court’s

139. See Carlisle, 114 A.3d at 604-05.
140. See id. (citing Bax, 28 A.3d at 1046).
141. See Chavin v. H.H. Rosin & Co., 246 A.2d 921, 922 (Del. 1968) (“It is, of course, axiomatic
that Equity has no jurisdiction over a controversy for which there is a complete and adequate remedy
at law.”); accord Bax, 28 A.3d at 1046 (“Even if the Court of Chancery did have the jurisdiction to
extend LLC derivative standing . . . it should exercise that jurisdiction only absent an adequate remedy at law.”). Although Chavin, which is cited by Bax, suggests that “equity has no jurisdiction”
where there is an adequate remedy at law, this is in fact an example of the type of conflation discussed infra note 142, confounding (i) “equity jurisdiction” and (ii) a principle of equity jurisprudence.
In fact, for claims asserting purely equitable rights, there exists exclusive equity jurisdiction irrespective of whether there is any adequate remedy at law. See infra note 142; see also Harman v.
Masoneilan Int’l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487, 498-99, 499 n.22 (Del. 1982) (holding that a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty falls within exclusive equity jurisdiction, and therefore, it is irrelevant whether there
is an adequate remedy available at law); Glanding v. Indus. Trust Co., 45 A.2d 553, 556 (Del. 1945)
(holding that “no positive restriction or limitation of the exercise of [the chancery court’s] equitable
jurisdiction resulted” from the existence of an adequate remedy at law); Bird v. Lida, Inc., 681 A.2d
399, 402 (Del. Ch. 1996) (Allen. C.) (holding that a claim asserting an equitable right, such as a claim
based on fiduciary duty, is subject to equity jurisdiction irrespective of the remedy sought in equity
or otherwise available at law); Boxer v. Husky Oil Co., 429 A.2d 995, 998 (Del. Ch. 1981) (Harnett,
V.C.) (“Where the relationship between the parties imposes an equitable obligation to account, equity
has always taken jurisdiction over the controversy, even where there may be an adequate remedy at
law.”). For this reason, the Delaware Supreme Court has held that title 10, section 342 of the Delaware Code—which provides that “[t]he Court of Chancery shall not have jurisdiction to determine
any matter wherein sufficient remedy may be had by common law, or statute”—“is ‘a mere declaration of the ancient rule of equity’ precluding equitable relief [and] . . . .‘being a mere declaration of
the ancient rule of equity, neither grants nor divests equity of any jurisdiction.’ ” In re ArzuagaGuevara, 794 A.2d 579, 586 (Del. 2001) (quoting Boxer, 429 A.2d at 998).
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equity jurisdiction applies to LLCs.142 As noted before, on this underlying constitutional question, Bax and Carlisle disagree. 143
In short, attempts to reconcile Bax and Carlisle are unconvincing.
Instead, the two cases represent an unresolved conflict in Delaware
law as to the role of equity in LLCs. How this conflict is ultimately

142. Equity jurisdiction means the power of the chancery court to hear and decide certain
kinds or classes of actions according to the principles of equity jurisprudence, which decisions
may involve either the determination of an equitable right or the granting of an equitable remedy. POMEROY, supra note 1, § 130, at 176. Whether that power should be exercised in any
given case is subject to the principles of equity jurisprudence. Professor Pomeroy long ago bemoaned that “[e]quity jurisdiction is distinct from equity jurisprudence” and the “constant
tendency to confound these two subjects . . . . has been productive of much confusion.” Id. § 131,
at 179-80. “[E]quity jurisdiction may exist over a case, although it is one which the doctrines of
equity jurisprudence forbid any relief to be given, or any right to be maintained.” Id. §131, at
180; see also id. §§ 131-33, at 179-82 (criticizing the conflation of equity jurisdiction with equity
jurisprudence and the oversimplification that equity jurisdiction applies only in cases where
there is a full, adequate, and complete remedy at law); id. §§ 217-18, 267-68 (same).
To appreciate this distinction, it can be helpful to separate exclusive equity jurisdiction from concurrent equity jurisdiction. Exclusive equity jurisdiction covers cases where
equity recognizes and protects a right not otherwise recognized at law; the right is purely
equitable in nature. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 11, § 42, at 102. The right to bring a derivative
suit on behalf of a business entity, as was the case in Bax, is a good example of a right
recognized by equity and, therefore, within the chancery court’s exclusive equity jurisdiction.
Concurrent equity jurisdiction, by contrast, covers cases where equity protects a legal right
with an equitable remedy, because the remedy available at law for the protection of that
right is inadequate. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 11, § 42, at 102; accord Harman v. Masoneilan
Int’l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487, 497 (Del. 1982) (defining the chancery court’s exclusive equity jurisdiction as “jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters and causes in equity” and its
concurrent equity jurisdiction as “jurisdiction over claims for which the remedy available at
law is insufficient”). For example, a suit seeking enforcement of a contract by specific performance, which is an equitable remedy, falls within the concurrent equity jurisdiction of the
chancery court.
The inadequacy of available legal remedies is the foundation—an essential element—
for concurrent equity jurisdiction. See Glanding, 45 A.2d at 559 (“[T]he very foundation of
concurrent jurisdiction is predicated upon the inadequacy of the remedy at law.”); POMEROY,
supra note 1, § 139, at 192, § 173, at 233-34, § 217, at 367. If there exists an adequate legal
remedy, there is no concurrent equity jurisdiction. By contrast, “the exclusive jurisdiction of
equity does not rest upon the inadequacy of legal remedies.” POMEROY, supra note 1, § 173,
at 234. “[E]xclusive equitable jurisdiction, or the power . . . . to adjudicate upon the subjectmatters coming within that jurisdiction, exists independently of the adequacy or inadequacy
of the legal remedies obtainable under the circumstances of any particular case.” Id. § 218,
at 368. Nonetheless, the principles of equity jurisprudence that govern the proper exercise
of exclusive equity jurisdiction “do also depend in some measure upon the insufficiency and
inadequacy of the remedies granted by the law.” POMEROY, supra note 1, § 173, at 234; accord
MCCLINTOCK, supra note 11, § 40, at 98-99 (“The existence of an adequate remedy at law
does not exclude the power of a court of equity to act in the matter, it only makes it improper
for it to act . . . .”).
Applied to Bax, it may be the case that as a jurisprudential matter, an LLC creditor
has adequate remedies at law and therefore is not deserving of the court’s equitable power
to grant derivative standing. But that is not the same as saying that the court lacks the
power—the equitable jurisdiction—to recognize and extend LLC derivative standing.
143. See supra note 130.
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resolved will have profound implications for the contract-law foundations of LLC law and practice.
IV. THE RESURGENCE OF EQUITY?
Does Carlisle signal the demise of Bax and a resurgent role for equity in LLC cases? And if so, will equity upend the statutorily promised
freedom of contract upon which hundreds of thousands of LLC agreements are based? Only a new decision by the Delaware Supreme Court
can definitively answer these questions. While Carlisle was decided
after Bax, meaning that it is the latest pronouncement from the Delaware courts on equity’s role in LLC cases, Carlisle is still a chancery
court decision. As a strictly legal matter, the chancery court cannot
overrule supreme court precedent.144
Nonetheless, there are good reasons to believe that Bax may be reversed, politely ignored, or distinguished into irrelevance. For one, as
Section A explains, Bax is based upon a fundamental misapprehension
of equity. Just as important, Section B describes changes in both Delaware’s LLC statute and judiciary since the time Bax was decided that
further erode the likelihood that Bax will be upheld in future cases.

A. Bax’s Misapprehension of Equity
Admittedly, the logic of Bax has a seductive simplicity to it: the
state constitution prohibits the legislature from reducing the chancery
court’s equitable powers to less than what those powers were in
1792.145 LLCs did not exist in 1792.146 Therefore, those equitable powers protected by the state constitution do not extend to LLCs.147
This simple logic, however, is built upon a fallacious premise: that
the equity jurisdiction that was vested in the chancery court in 1792
is frozen in time and incapable of adapting itself to new constructs or

144. Still, as a practical matter, Carlisle would not be the first time the chancery court
has reversed the precedent of the high court. See Mohsen Manesh, Damning Dictum: The
Default Duty Debate in Delaware, 39 J. CORP. L. 35, 54 (2013) [hereinafter Manesh, Damning Dictum] (describing In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996)
as an example of the Delaware Chancery Court using dicta to overturn antiquated Delaware
Supreme Court precedent).
145. See Bax, 28 A.3d at 1044 (“The Delaware Constitution prohibits the General Assembly from limiting the equity jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery to less than the general
equity jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery of Great Britain existing at the time of our
separation from the Mother Country.”).
146. Id. at 1045 (“[T]his case deals not with a corporation but with a statutorily created
LLC—a business entity that did not exist in 1792.”).
147. Id. (“Therefore, nothing in the Delaware Constitution precludes the General Assembly from limiting the scope of [the equitable doctrine of] derivative standing [in LLCs].”).
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circumstances. This premise fundamentally misapprehends equity jurisdiction. The “very nature of equity” 148 is to be flexible and
responsive 149—a corrective salve where the strict application of law
would otherwise serve injustice. 150
Indeed, in Carlisle, Vice Chancellor Laster emphasized equity’s intrinsically adaptive nature, 151 quoting extensively from the Delaware
Supreme Court’s opinion in Schoon v. Smith, 152 decided just three
years before Bax. In Schoon, a corporate director sought to extend the
equitable right of derivative standing to enable directors, in addition
to stockholders, to bring suit on behalf of a corporation. 153 In considering this issue, the supreme court set forth a lengthy and erudite
discussion on “[t]he [e]xtension of [e]quitable [d]octrine” to new contexts. 154 The Schoon court observed that “equity jurisdiction ‘has taken
its shape and its substance from the perceived inadequacies of the common law and the changing demands of a developing nation.’ ” 155 It “has
an expansive power[] to meet new exigencies.” 156 After all, “the final
object of equity is to do right and justice.” 157 Therefore, the Schoon
court concluded, “[j]udicially-created equitable doctrines may be extended so long as the extension is consistent with the principles
of equity.” 158
Schoon is in accord with other Delaware Supreme Court precedents. Consider, for example Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center,159

148. See Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 204 (Del. 2008) (describing equity’s ability to
evolve in order to address new developments and “perceived inadequacies of the common
law” as “the very nature of equity”); cf. Severns v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 421 A.2d 1334,
1348 (Del. 1980) (“[T]he very essence of our system of equity . . . is to render the ‘jurisprudence as a whole adequate to the social needs . . . possess[ing] an inherent capacity of
expansion, so as to keep abreast of each succeeding generation and age.’ ” (quoting POMEROY,
supra note 1, § 67, at 89)).
149. See Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 1, at 819-20 (attributing the longevity of the
Delaware Chancery Court “to the Court’s ability to adapt principles of equity developed centuries ago to ever-changing economic circumstances and legal relationships”); Oleck, supra
note 11, at 25 (“[E]quity is, or should be, a living, changing thing, forever adapting itself to
new conditions . . . . The avoidance of the freezing of law into inflexible rules is one of its
chief purposes.”).
150. See supra notes 11-22 and accompanying text.
151. See In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC, 114 A.3d 592, 602-03 (Del. Ch. 2015).
152. 953 A.2d 196 (Del. 2008).
153. See id. at 199-200.
154. Id. at 204-05.
155. Id. at 204 (quoting DONALD J. WOLFE, JR. & MICHAEL A. PITTENGER, 1 CORPORATE
AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICE IN THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY § 2–2[a], at 2–2 (2006)).
156. Id. at 206 (quoting 1 STORY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 45 (Isaac F. Redfield, ed., 9th ed. 1866)).
157. Id. at 205 (quoting POMEROY, supra note 1, § 60, at 80).
158. Id.
159. Severns v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980).
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a case in which the petitioner sought a novel form of equitable relief:
the authority to remove life support from his incurably comatose
spouse. 160 In holding that the chancery court’s historical equitable powers include the power to grant the extraordinary relief requested, the
high court stated that “the very essence of our system of equity . . . [is
its] inherent capacity of expansion, so as to keep abreast of each succeeding generation and age.” 161 Indeed, the Severns court explicitly
asserted that “nothing in [Dupont] indicates that the [chancery court’s]
fashioning of [equitable] relief is limited to that which was available
in 1776.” 162
The Bax court’s answer to the intrinsically adaptive nature of equity,
as described in Schoon and Severns, is that it applies to corporate cases
only. Citing Schoon, the Bax court asserted that “[o]ur precedent
shows . . . that the common law equity power to extend derivative standing to address new circumstances is . . . limited to the corporate
context.” 163 But this limitation on equity jurisdiction is both novel and
peculiar to Bax; it is not borne from Schoon to which the Bax court cited.
To be sure, Schoon was decided in the corporate setting. But nothing in
Schoon—or any other precedent—suggests that equity’s ability to extend itself onto new circumstances and relations as justice dictates is
limited to only the corporate context. 164 Indeed, the high court’s extension of equity jurisdiction in Severns to cover the removal of life
support—a remedy “novel to Delaware and, relatively speaking, . . . new
in our civilization”165—belies the naïve notion that equity is so
historically cabined.
More importantly, even if, as Bax asserts, past Delaware precedents showed that equitable doctrines have been extended in only
corporate cases, equity is not so strictly bound by past precedents. Recognizing equity’s inherently capacious nature, the high court in
Severns flatly stated that “the absence of precedent is no bar to the
award of appropriate relief’’ in equity. 166 Schoon elaborated on this
point, quoting at length from Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence:

160. See id. at 1339-40.
161. Id. at 1348.
162. Id.
163. CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 1037, 1045 (Del. 2011) (emphasis added).
164. For example, in Schoon the court says, speaking in the context of corporate derivative standing, that “equitable doctrine can be judicially extended to address new
circumstances,” without ever suggesting that those “new circumstances” must involve a corporation. Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 204 (Del. 2008).
165. Severns, 421 A.2d at 1349.
166. Id. at 1348. To support this assertion, the Severns court quoted at length from
American Jurisprudence, among other sources: “The absence of a precedent for the giving of
[equitable] relief in a case where it is evident that under general principles of equity relief
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The true function of precedents is that of illustrating principles;
they are examples of the manner and extent to which principles
have been applied; they are the landmarks by which the court determines the course and direction in which principles have been
carried. But with all this guiding, limiting, and restraining efficacy
of prior decisions, the Chancellor always has had, and always must
have, a certain power and freedom of action, not possessed by the
courts of law, of adapting the doctrines which he administers. He

can extend those doctrines to new relations, and shape his remedies
to new circumstances, if the relations and circumstances come
within the principles of equity . . . . 167

Echoing these fundamental precepts, Chancellor Allen presciently observed—just five years before the Delaware LLC statute was enacted—
that “[t]he nature of chancery’s particular mission forecloses the development of fixed and limited categories of relationships over which
equity will take jurisdiction . . . . We cannot predict all categories of
relationships in which that power may properly be called intoaction.”168
In this regard, Bax’s attempt to confine equity to “fixed and limited
categories of relationships”—namely corporations and other business
forms in existence at the time of this nation’s independence—runs
counter to the very nature of equity. It contradicts a basic maxim of

should be granted is of no consequence and presents no obstacle to the exercise of the jurisdiction of an equity court.” Id. (quoting 27 AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 121); accord Neal v. Ala. ByProducts Corp., 1988 WL 105754, at *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 11, 1988) (Berger, V.C.) (“[L]ack of
precedent is not a bar to the exercise of this Court’s equitable powers.”).
167. Schoon, 953 A.2d at 204-05 (quoting POMEROY, supra note 1, § 60, at 77-78) (emphasis added). Elsewhere, Professor Pomeroy explained in his widely-cited treatise:
[T]he already settled principles of equity jurisprudence. . . . may unquestionably
be extended to new facts and circumstances as they arise, which are analogous
to facts and circumstances that have already been the subject-matter of judicial
decision . . . .
All who are conversant with the history of equity jurisprudence know that . . . it
has been of constant growth and development from its inception . . . . The jurisdiction of a court of equity does not depend upon the mere accident whether the court
has, in some previous case or at some distant period of time, granted relief under
similar circumstances, but rather upon the necessities of mankind . . .
POMEROY, supra note 1, § 47, at 62, § 67, at 89-90 (emphasis added); In addition to Pomeroy’s
Equity Jurisprudence, the Schoon court also cites McClintock on Equity, supra note

11, § 4, at 10, for the proposition that “the chancellors could adapt their system to meet
changing needs without resorting to the fiction that they were merely interpreting and applying former rules, but the tendency to follow the path laid out by former chancellors was
strong.” Schoon, 953 A.2d at 205 n.24.
168. McMahon v. New Castle Assoc., 532 A.2d 601, 605 (Del. Ch. 1987).
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equity: that equity regards substance rather than form. 169 LLCs represent precisely the type of analogous “new relations” to which Professor
Pomeroy alluded. 170 Yet, by excluding LLCs from the domain of equity
based solely upon the historical date the LLC form came into existence,
Bax ironically smacks of the very rigidity and technical formalism to
which equity originally arose as an ameliorative.

B. Subsequent Changes Undermining Bax
By starting with a flawed premise, Bax reaches a flawed conclusion.
This alone would be reason enough to believe that future cases will
disavow, disregard, or distinguish Bax and instead embrace Carlisle’s
characterization of equity jurisdiction as applied to LLCs. But events
since the time Bax was decided only reaffirm this prediction. Since
Bax, changes in both Delaware’s LLC statute and its state bench suggest the ‘purely contractarian’ view of LLCs, upon which Bax was
based, no longer has purchase.

1. Changes in the LLC Statute
At the time Bax was decided, there was an ongoing debate among
members of the bar, bench, and academy about the role of equity in
LLCs. 171 Some advocated for a “purely contractarian” view of the
169. POMEROY, supra note 1, § 378, at 40-41 (“[E]quity regards substance rather than
form . . . . Equity always attempts to get at the substance of things, and to ascertain, uphold,
and enforce rights and duties which spring from the real relations of parties.”).
170. Kelly v. Blum, No. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *11 n.73 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2010)
(Parsons, V.C.) (“Manger-managed LLCs are, in many ways, analogous to corporations,
whereas member-managed LLCs may be more analogous to a partnership.”); cf. Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 850 (Del. Ch. 2012) (Strine, C.) (“The manager
of an LLC—which is in plain words a limited liability “company” having many of the features
of a corporation—easily fits the definition of a fiduciary.” (emphasis added)).
171. The debate divided into three camps. Anti-contractarians believe that the equitable
principle of fiduciary duty should not be subject to contractual limitations or waivers. See,
e.g., Callison & Vestal, supra note 5; Reza Dibadj, The Misguided Transformation of Loyalty
into Contract, 41 TULSA L. REV. 451 (2006); Kleinberger, supra note 2; Sandra K. Miller, The

Best of Both Worlds: Default Fiduciary Duties and Contractual Freedom in Alternative Business Entities, 39 J. CORP. L. 295, 315-24 (2014); Sandra K. Miller, Fiduciary Duties in the
LLC: Mandatory Core Duties to Protect the Interests of Others Beyond the Contracting Parties, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 243, 254-60 (2009); Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in
Balancing Contractual Freedom with the Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic
and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1609 (2004). Traditional contractarians

believe that the equitable principle of fiduciary duty should be the default rule, but subject
to contractual limitations or waivers. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?,
2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 249 (“[A]s in limited partnerships and corporations, managers of
manager-managed LLCs should have default fiduciary duties.”); Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duties and Limited Partnership Agreements, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 927, 965 (2004)
(“Fiduciary duties in business associations should be regarded as default rules that work
together with, and can be displaced by, explicit provisions of the contract.”); Larry E. Ribstein, The Uncorporation and Corporate Indeterminacy, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 131, 147
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LLC.172 Under the “purely contractarian” view, an LLC agreement is
like any other contract. 173 As a contract, the relationship of the members and managers involved in an LLC is defined by the terms of their
LLC agreement, rather than by any judicially imposed rights and obligations. 174 Put differently, as a purely contractual entity, LLCs do not
operate against the same background of equity, including fiduciary duties, that courts have traditionally applied to corporations and
partnerships. 175 In support of the purely contractarian view, adherents
pointed to Delaware’s strong legislative policy favoring the freedom of
contract for LLCs, 176 arguing that this statutory language confirms
LLCs are defined solely by contract and not by equitably implied rights

(arguing, in the limited partnership context, that “only where that [governing] document is
silent or ambiguous” should a court “look for guidance from the statutory default rules [or]
traditional notions of fiduciary duties”). Finally, pure contractarians believe that the LLC is
a purely contractual relationship to which the equitable principle of fiduciary duty is inapplicable even as default rule. See, e.g., Fisk Ventures LLC v. Segal, No. 3017–CC, 2008 WL
1961156, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 7, 2008) (Chandler, C.) aff’d 984 A.2d 124 (Del. 2009)
(“[A]ffirmed on the basis of and for the reasons assigned by the Court of Chancery.” (emphasis added)); Ann E. Conaway & Peter I. Tsoflias, Challenging Traditional Thought: No
Default Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Liability Companies After Auriga, 13 J. BUS.
& SEC. L. 1 (2012); Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in
Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 221
(2009); Nicole M. Sciotto, Note, Opt-In vs. Opt-Out: Settling the Debate over Default Fiduciary Duties in Delaware LLCs, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 531 (2012).
172. Fisk Ventures, 2008 WL 1961156, at *1 (Chandler, C.) (“Contractual language defines the scope, structure, and personality of [LLCs].”); Conaway & Tsoflias, supra note 171,
at 6 (“ ‘[F]reedom of contract’ signifies to a reviewing court that a Delaware LLC is a bargained-for, contractual entity . . . . ”); Sciotto, supra note 171, at 555 (“LLCs are ‘creatures of
contract’ whose relationships must be governed solely by the LLC agreement’s terms . . . .”);
Steele, supra note 171, at 242 (arguing that “courts should analyze LLC agreements by the
parties’ agreement alone” without reference to default equitable principles).
173. Fisk Ventures, 2008 WL 1961156, at *8 (Chandler, C.) (“In the context of [LLCs],
which are creatures not of the state but of contract, [those] duties or obligations [of the parties] must be found in the LLC Agreement or some other contract.” (footnote omitted));
Steele, supra note 171, at 235 (asserting that with respect to the interpretation of LLC agreements “my answer is simple: treat it like a contract”).
174. See supra note 172.
175. See Conaway & Tsoflias, supra note 171, at 11-12 (arguing that LLCs, unlike corporations, general partnerships and limited partnerships, do not warrant judicially imposed
fiduciary duties); Sciotto, supra note 171, at 561 (same).
176. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2016).
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or obligations. 177 This statutory language, adherents argued, even displaced the “rules of law and equity” that the LLC statute provides
would otherwise apply in LLC cases.178
The purely contractarian view of LLCs appears to have animated
the Delaware Supreme Court’s ruling in Bax. In rejecting the notion
that the chancery court’s constitutionally vested equity jurisdiction extends to LLCs, the high court reasoned that LLCs do not operate
against the background of equity that applies to corporations. 179 This
reasoning makes sense if LLCs, unlike corporations, represent a
purely contractual relationship.
In this regard, Bax laid the foundation for the high court’s more
notorious ruling in Gatz Properties v. Auriga Capital, 180 decided just
fourteen months later. Recall in Gatz, then-Chancellor Strine held in
the chancery court that individuals vested with discretionary power to
manage the business of an LLC owe a fiduciary duty to the LLC and
its members unless those duties are modified or waived by the terms
of the LLC agreement. 181 On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court cast
doubt on this seemingly uncontroversial holding.182 Calling into question a long line of chancery court precedents, 183 the high court
suggested that fiduciary duties are not just subordinate to the freedom
of contract, but wholly inapplicable to LLCs. 184 Although the high
court’s ruling in Gatz surprised many academics, practitioners, and
177. See, e.g., R & R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, No. 3803-CC,
2008 WL 3846318, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008) (citing the statutorily prescribed “freedom
of contract” to assert that LLCs are “creatures of contract” (internal citations omitted)); Conaway & Tsoflias, supra note 171, at 4 (citing the statutorily prescribed “freedom of contract”
to assert that LLCs are “contractual in nature; and [therefore,] [] contractual principles were
to be given dominance above tort-based, fiduciary principles”); Steele, supra note 171, at 234
(“[The] general principle of freedom of contract annunciated by the legislature indicates that
courts should not assume that default fiduciary duties apply.”).
178. See Conaway & Tsoflias, supra note 171, at 27 (arguing that the Delaware LLC
statute’s express policy of freedom of contract “fill[s] the void” in which the rules of “law and
equity” provision might otherwise apply); Sciotto, supra note 171, at 556 (“T]he unambiguous
legislative intent to ‘give [sic] the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract’
read in tandem with the statutory authorization permitting the elimination or modification
of fiduciary duties, ostensibly displaces any reliance upon the catch-all ‘law and equity’ provision . . . .” (quoting Auriga, 40 A.3d 839, 849-52 (Del. 2012)).
179. See supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
180. Gatz Props., LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012). See generally Manesh,
Damning Dictum, supra note 144 (criticizing the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Gatz).
181. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
182. See Gatz, 59 A.3d at 1218-19.
183. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
184. See Gatz, 59 A.3d at 1218-19 (asserting that “reasonable minds could differ” on the
question of whether fiduciary duties apply to LLCs, even in the absence of an agreement
limiting or eliminating such duties); see also Manesh, Damning Dictum, supra note 144, at
48 (“[T]he supreme court [in Gatz] made clear that going forward, contract drafters and parties to LLC agreements could no longer take default fiduciary duties for granted.”).
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jurists,185 it was entirely consistent with Bax’s purely contractarian
view of LLCs.186 After all, under the purely contractarian view, the relationship among members and managers in a LLC is contractual. And
the only judicially implied duty owed by contract parties is the implied
covenant of good faith and dealing. 187 Contract parties are not fiduciaries of one another. 188
The purely contractarian view of LLCs has always been flawed.
LLCs, like other business entities, provide parties with legal benefits
that simply cannot be contracted for by individuals through private
agreement. 189 As Vice Chancellor Laster concisely observed in Carlisle,
[T]he purely contractarian view discounts core attributes of the LLC
that only the sovereign can authorize, such as its separate legal existence, potentially perpetual life, and limited liability for its
members. . . . [W]hen a sovereign makes available an entity with
attributes that contracting parties cannot grant themselves by
agreement, the entity is not purely contractual. . . .
....
. . . Put more directly, an LLC agreement is not an exclusively private contract among its members precisely because the LLC has
powers that only the State of Delaware can confer. 190

For this reason, it has never been quite correct to suggest that LLCs
are merely “creatures of contract,” as courts sometimes do. 191 Although
185. See Manesh, Damning Dictum, supra note 144, at 48.
186. Indeed, in assessing Bax, one noted attorney presciently predicted that Bax’s “treatment of . . . equit[y] jurisdiction . . . may be most interesting over time. . . . [O]ne might watch
for a contractarian expansion of the originalist position [espoused in Bax] in the case of LLC
fiduciary duties.” Bill Callison, Thoughts on Creditor Fiduciary Duties After CML V v. Bax,
CONGLOMERATE BLOG (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/09/thoughtson-creditor-fiduciary-duties-after-cml-v-v-bax.html [https://perma.cc/62MH-HSR4].
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Every contract
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement.”); Mohsen Manesh, Express Terms and the Implied Contractual Covenant of
Delaware Law, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (2013) [hereinafter Manesh, Express Terms](“Like
the law of other states, the Implied Covenant is an unwaivable obligation implied into every
contract under Delaware law.”); Steele, supra note 171, at 234 (“Under Delaware contract
jurisprudence, Delaware courts have limited their application of default duties to the implied
contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing.”).
188. See Conaway & Tsoflias, supra note 171, at 2, 4-5 (endorsing the purely contractarian view and asserting that “fiduciary duties are unnecessary in the LLC business form”
because “[c]ontract law does not impose fiduciary duties between parties”).
189. See In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC, 114 A.3d 592, 605-06 (Del. Ch. 2015) (noting flaws
in the “purely contractarian” view of LLCs); Johnson, supra note 22, at 721 (“[A]ll . . . business statutes . . . confer state-ordained benefits—limited liability being the obvious example
that participants themselves do not and cannot create by contract inter se.”).
190. Carlisle, 114 A.3d at 605-06 (citation omitted).
191. See, e.g., Kelly v. Blum, No. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *7 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24,
2010) (Parsons, V.C.) (“LLCs are creatures of contract . . . .”); R & R Capital, LLC v.
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LLCs are primarily “creatures of contract,” they are also inescapably
creatures of the state, just like other statutory business forms.192
Whatever the merits of the purely contractarian view of LLCs, it
has now been soundly rejected by the Delaware General Assembly.193
In 2013, the Delaware legislature amended the LLC statute to provide
that “[i]n any case not provided for in this chapter, the rules of law and
equity, including the rules of law and equity relating to fiduciary
duties . . . shall govern.” 194 This amendment was passed as a direct
response to the high court’s Gatz decision. 195 In amending the LLC
statute, the Delaware General Assembly confirmed that LLCs are not
purely contractual entities, but instead are a form of business association that operates against the same background “of law and equity,
including the rules of law and equity relating to fiduciary duties” that
applies to other business forms. 196

Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, No. 3803-CC, 2008 WL 3846318, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug.
19, 2008) (Chandler, C.) (“[LLCs] are creatures of contract, ‘designed to afford the maximum
amount of freedom of contract, private ordering and flexibility to the parties involved.’ ”
(quoting Travel Ctrs. of Am., LLC, v. Brog, C.A., No. 3516-CC, 2008 WL 1746987, at *1
(Del.Ch. Apr.3, 2008))); Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017–CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *8
(Del. Ch. May 7, 2008) (Chandler, C.) (“In the context of [LLCs], which are creatures not of
the state but of contract, [any] duties or obligations must be found in the LLC
[a]greement . . . .”); accord In re Atlas Energy Res., LLC, No. 4589-VCN, 2010 WL 4273122,
at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010) (Noble, V.C.).
192. See Johnson, supra note 22, at 721 (“Of course, like many close business arrangements, . . . [LLCs] are creatures of both statute and contract.”); accord REVISED UNIFORM
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT § 110 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2006) (“A [LLC] is as much
a creature of contract as of statute.”); Obeid v. Hogan, No. 11900–VCL, 2016 WL 3356851,
at *5, n.2 (Del. Ch. June 10, 2016) (Laster, V.C.) (“It is frequently observed that LLCs ‘are
creatures of contract,’ which they primarily are. . . . The adverb ‘primarily’ recognizes the
critical but sometimes overlooked non-contractual dimensions of the entity.”); Brog, No.
3751-CC, 2008 WL 5272861, at *2 (“[LLCs] are primarily creatures of contract.” (emphasis
added)). Even former Chief Justice Myron Steele, a leading advocate of the purely contractarian view, is forced to concede the inexorable role of the state in LLCs when he
acknowledges that LLCs exist due to state statutes. See, e.g., CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d
1037, 1045 (Del. 2011) (Steele, C.J.) (“[W]hen adjudicating the rights, remedies, and obligations associated with Delaware LLCs, courts must look to the LLC Act because it is only the
statute that creates those rights, remedies, and obligations.”); Myron T. Steele, Judicial

Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 5 (2007) [hereinafter Steele, Judicial Scrutiny] (“[L]imited

partnerships and [LLCs], like corporations, are creatures of statute . . . .”).
193. See Carlisle, 114 A.3d at 605 (“[T]he General Assembly in 2013 adopted an amendment
to the LLC Act inconsistent with the purely contractarian view.”); Jowers & Adams, supra note
122, at 1 (“Both the case law [citing Carlisle] and an amendment to the Delaware [LLC statute]
in recent years demonstrate Delaware’s rejection of a solely contractarian view of LLCs.”).
194. H.B. 126, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2013).
195. See Manesh, Damning Dictum, supra note 144, at 67-68.
196. See Jowers & Adams, supra note 122, at 3 (“The debate regarding whether a Delaware LLC should be viewed as a purely contractual entity to which principles of equity
(including fiduciary duties) do not apply was resolved in 2013 when the Delaware General
Assembly adopted [the] amendment to [the state’s LLC statute].”).
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The legislature’s rejection of Gatz also has clear implications for
Bax. By confirming that traditional equitable principles apply to
LLCs, the 2013 amendment repudiates Bax’s central conclusion. With
this central tenant of Bax now undermined by the state’s legislature,
Delaware jurists may not feel bound to follow Bax in future cases despite principles of stare decisis. Indeed, this consideration, in part, is
what motivated Vice Chancellor Laster to depart from Bax in Carlisle. 197 After all, if traditional equitable principles apply to LLCs,

as the Delaware statute now explicitly makes clear, 198 then the
chancery court’s jurisdiction to apply and enforce those principles is
constitutionally protected. 199

2. Changes Among the Delaware Judiciary
Aside from the recent change to the Delaware LLC statute, there is
another reason to question Bax’s continued viability as binding precedent. Since Bax was decided, the leading advocate of the purely
contractarian view of LLCs has left the Delaware Supreme Court and
been replaced by a jurist with a decidedly different perspective.
Writing academically, in an extrajudicial capacity, the former Chief
Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, Myron Steele, was a forceful
proponent of the purely contractarian view of LLCs. 200 Later, the chief
justice would author the Bax decision and also likely had a strong influence in Gatz, an unsigned per curiam opinion. 201 As noted above,
both decisions are grounded in the purely contractarian perspective.202

197. See Carlisle, 114 A.3d at 605 (“[T]he General Assembly in 2013 adopted an amendment to the LLC Act inconsistent with the purely contractarian view.”).
198. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1104 (2016).
199. Although the statutory language suggests that equitable principles are merely a
gap-filler in the LLC context, applicable only where the statute or relevant LLC agreement
does not address a particular matter, the statute nonetheless reflects the legislature’s concession that traditional equitable principles do in fact apply to LLCs. This concession is
important, because if traditional equitable principles do apply to LLCs, then the chancery
court’s jurisdiction to recognize and apply those principles is constitutionally protected.
200. See generally Steele, supra note 171 (espousing the purely contractarian view); see also
Q&A with Chief Justice Myron T. Steele of the Delaware Supreme Court, PRAC. L.J. (Dec. 1,
2012), http://us.practicallaw.com/3-515-1049 [http://perma.cc/B4J7-95P3] (“Those who advocate
for default fiduciary duties . . . . miss the fact that the LLC . . . statute’s explicit policy is to maximize contractual freedom. The way to maximize contractual freedom is to look at . . . the contract.
. . . [LLC parties’] entire relationship is driven by the terms of the contract.”).
201. See Manesh, Damning Dictum, supra note 144, at 62-64 (arguing that the unanimity norm at the Delaware Supreme Court coupled with Chief Justice Steele’s idiosyncratic,
purely contractarian view of LLCs, resulted in the per curium opinion in Gatz); D. Gordon
Smith, Contractually Adopted Fiduciary Duty, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1783, 1791 (observing
that the Gatz opinion “bears the fingerprints of . . . Chief Justice . . . Steele”).
202. See supra notes 179-88 and accompanying text.
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Since Bax and Gatz, Chief Justice Steele has retired from the
bench. 203 He was succeeded by Leo Strine, formerly the Chancellor of
the Delaware Chancery Court and before that a Vice Chancellor. 204
There is, of course, a delicious coincidence in this choice of replacement. Then-Chancellor Strine was the author of the chancery court
Gatz opinion that the supreme court repudiated on appeal.205
A cursory review of then-Chancellor Strine’s chancery court opinion
in Gatz makes clear that he disagrees with the purely contractarian
premise that traditional equitable principles are inapplicable to LLCs.
In Gatz, the then-chancellor variously described LLCs as subject to an
“equity backdrop,” “equitable background,” and “equity overlay.” 206
And applying “traditional and settled principles of equity,” he concluded that “[m]anagers of LLCs easily qualify as fiduciaries.” 207
To be sure, like other Delaware jurists, Chief Justice Strine has in
the past recognized and deferred to the freedom of contract mandated
by the LLC statute.208 But the chief justice has yet to express an opinion on how this statutorily mandated freedom of contract interacts
with the chancery court’s constitutionally vested equitable powers.
Having acknowledged that traditional principles of equity apply to
LLCs, it follows that the chancery court’s jurisdiction to recognize and
apply those principles is constitutionally protected. And because that
jurisdiction is constitutionally protected, the chancery court’s equitable powers cannot be abridged by legislation or private agreement.
Finally, lest one might overly focus on the views of one chief justice,
it bears noting that he is only one of five members of the Delaware
Supreme Court. Like the now-retired chief justice, the four other members of the Bax Court also no longer serve as justices on the high
203. See Chief Justice Steele Retiring, THE NEWS J., Sep. 7, 2013.
204. See Strine Officially Sworn in, THE NEWS J., Mar. 1, 2014.
205. See supra notes 180-88 and accompanying text.
206. See Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 851, 853, 854 (Del. Ch.
2012) (Strine, C.).
207. Id. at 854 (emphasis added); accord id. at 856 n.65 (“[M]anagers of LLCs owe fiduciary duties because they fit within the classic definition of a fiduciary of a business
enterprise under traditional principles of equity.”).
208. See, e.g., id. at 852 (Strine, C.) (“Where the parties [to an LLC agreement] have
clearly supplanted default principles [of fiduciary duty] in full, we give effect to the parties’
contract choice.”); Related Westpac LLC v. Jer Snowmass LLC, No. 5001–VCS, 2010 WL
2929708, at *8 (Del. Ch. July 23, 2010) (Strine, V.C.) (“When . . . [parties] cover a particular
subject in an express manner, their contractual choice governs and cannot be supplanted by
the application of inconsistent fiduciary duty principles that might otherwise apply as a default.”); R.S.M. Inc. v. All. Capital Mgmt. Holdings L.P., 790 A.2d 478, 497 (Del. Ch. 2001)
(Strine, V.C.) (observing in the limited partnership context that “where the use of default
fiduciary duties would intrude upon . . . contractual rights . . . or be insensible in view of the
contractual mechanisms governing the transaction under consideration, the court will eschew fiduciary concepts and focus on a purely contractual analysis of the dispute”).
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court. 209 None of the state supreme court’s new appointees have yet
expressed an opinion on the constitutional question. 210 But given Chief
Justice Strine’s outsized role in the development of Delaware corporate
and alternative entity law as well as the unanimity norm among
the Delaware justices, 211 it is likely his views will be influential on his
new colleagues.
V. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES
Based on the foregoing discussion, Bax’s precedential value is at
best dubious. Still, even if Carlisle portends the demise of Bax and
a reinvigorated role for equity, the overt consequences will be modest in practice. Equity is unlikely to upend the hundreds of
thousands of agreements governing Delaware LLCs today. As Section A explains, both policy and pragmatic considerations suggest
the Delaware Chancery Court will be judiciously sparing in the use
of its constitutionally vested equitable powers. Given the central importance of certainty and predictability in business relations, the
court is unlikely to subvert the express terms of an LLC agreement
in order “to do right and justice” in all but the most exceptional
cases. One exceptional circumstance, Section B suggests, may be
that of involving publicly traded LLCs and limited partnerships,
where the courts have otherwise struggled to obtain just results in
the face of prolix, unread, and unnegotiated agreements that authorize bad faith or self-dealing. But even in this narrow context, the
judicial use of equitable power will be tempered by the availability
of adequate legal remedies and market-based considerations that
weigh against the exercise of equitable discretion.
Consequently, the practical role of equity in LLCs will be more
subtle than overt. Because even if the Delaware courts seldom assert their equitable jurisdiction, the very existence of an
unwaivable judicial power “to do right and justice” may chasten
parties against brazen overreach in the drafting of LLC agreements
209. Bax was a unanimous opinion of Justices Steele, Holland, Berger, and Ridgely
(along with Judge Bradley, a lower court judge who participated in the Bax case ad hoc pursuant to the high court’s internal procedures). Since Bax, Justices Steele, Berger, Ridgely,
and Holland have all retired from the Delaware Supreme Court. See CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28
A.3d 1037 (Del. 2011); David Marcus, Ridgely Becomes Fourth in String of Delaware Justices
to Step Down, THE DEAL, Nov. 10, 2014; David Marcus, Holland to Retire from Delaware
Supreme Court, THE DEAL, Feb. 19, 2017.
210. But see Trusa v. Nepo, No. CV 12071-VCMR, 2017 WL 1379594, at *8 (Del. Ch. Apr.
13, 2017) (Montgomery-Reeves, V.C.) (citing Carlisle to recognize the power of the chancery
court to order equitable dissolution of an LLC).
211. See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate
Law, 83 VA. L. REV. 127 (1997) (describing and providing evidence of the unanimity norm
among the justices of the Delaware Supreme Court).
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or exploitation in performance thereunder. 212 Put differently, freedom of contract will subsist, but it will be exercised always in the
shadow of the courts’ equitable power. 213

A. Constraints on Unbridled Equity
To say that the Delaware state constitution precludes any state
statute or LLC agreement from divesting the chancery court of its
equitable powers, as Carlisle did, does not mean that the terms of an
LLC agreement that purport to limit fiduciary duties or other equitable rights or obligations are per se invalid. 214 Rather, it simply
means that the chancery court need not unquestioningly defer to the
language of an LLC agreement in every conceivable circumstance—
especially in light of conduct that is manifestly opportunistic, exploitative, or otherwise inequitable. 215
Judicial disregard of express contract terms in the face of inequitable circumstances is not novel to LLC law. Consider Haley v. Talcott, 216
a case decided by Chief Justice Strine, then a vice chancellor, a decade
before Carlisle. In Haley, the then-vice chancellor ordered the dissolution of an LLC on equitable grounds despite the fact that the governing
LLC agreement included a “detailed exit provision” for the petitioning
member to withdraw from the business without the LLC’s dissolution.217 Acknowledging that the “contract-law foundations” of LLC law,
“grounded on principles of freedom of contract[,] . . . bear[] on the propriety of ordering dissolution,” 218 the vice chancellor nonetheless
ordered dissolution, explaining that the “exit mechanism [set forth in
the LLC agreement] fails as an adequate remedy . . . because it does

212. Cf. Mohsen Manesh, Indeterminacy and Self-Enforcement: A Defense of Delaware’s
Approach to Director Independence in Derivative Litigation, 6 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 177, 197

(2006) (arguing that Delaware law’s indeterminate standards for director independence encourage boards to self-police to avoid judicial scrutiny of suspect director relationships).
213. Cf. Lyman Johnson, Enduring Equity in the Close Corporation, 33 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 313, 330-36 (2011) (describing the vital role of equity in corporate law and the enduring
“uneasy tension” between law and equity); Mark J. Loewenstein, Equity and Corporate Law,
68 SMU L. REV. 783, 789-92 (2015) (arguing that equity introduces uncertainty and undermines private ordering in corporate law).
214. See Johnson, supra note 22, at 718-19.
215. See id.; id at 721 (arguing that it, in light of the chancery court’s constitutionally
vested equity power, the proper construction of the LLC statute is to permit fiduciary waivers, but not in every conceivable instance).
216. Haley v. Talcott, 864 A.2d 86 (Del. Ch. 2004).
217. Id. at 97-98.
218. Id. at 93, 96.
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not equitably effect the separation of the parties” given the specific
circumstances of that case. 219
Admittedly, in asserting equity over the “detailed” terms of the LLC
agreement, Haley did not explicitly rely on the chancery court’s constitutionally protected equitable jurisdiction. Carlisle, however,
furnishes the constitutional basis for Haley. Even though Carlisle addressed a statutory provision, rather than an LLC agreement, Vice
Chancellor Laster made clear in dicta that, as a constitutional matter,
the chancery court retains the equitable discretion to disregard the express terms of an LLC agreement where equity demands it.220
In exercising this equitable discretion, a court might consider a variety of factors 221: the sophistication of the parties to the LLC
agreement; whether that agreement was negotiated, a form agreement, 222 or unilaterally drafted and offered on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis; how specifically the contractual language in that agreement condones the challenged conduct or otherwise addresses the
circumstances at issue; 223 the moral or commercial repugnance of the

219. Id. at 98. Although the petitioning member seeking judicial dissolution could have
exercised his rights under the LLC agreement to withdraw from the LLC and receive fair
market value for his share of the business, his withdrawal would not relieve him of his obligation as a personal guarantor of a mortgage on the LLC’s assets. Id. at 88. Consequently,
the petitioning member “would still be left holding the bag on the guaranty. It is therefore
not equitable to force [him] to use the exit mechanism [set forth in the LLC agreement] in
this circumstance,” the court ruled. Id. at 98 (footnote omitted).
220. See In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC, 114 A.3d 592, 605 (Del. Ch. 2015) (“This court has
held that the parties to an LLC agreement can waive by contract the right to seek statutory
dissolution . . . . In my view, the ability to waive [statutory] dissolution . . . does not extend to
a party’s standing to seek dissolution in equity.” (citations omitted)); cf. Huatuco v. Satellite
Healthcare & Satellite Dialysis of Tracy, LLC, No. 8465–VCG, 2013 WL 6460898, at *1 n.2
(Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2013) (questioning “[w]hether [LLC] parties may, by contract, divest this
Court of its authority to order a dissolution in all circumstances, even where it appears manifest that equity so requires . . . .”), aff’d, 93 A.3d 654 (Del. 2014) (unpublished table decision);
Jowers & Adams, supra note 122, at 1 (“Based on Carlisle, the Court of Chancery may use its
equitable powers to dissolve a Delaware LLC even where neither the operating agreement
nor the LLC Act expressly permits such dissolution.”). But see R & R Capital, LLC v. Buck &
Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, No. 3803-CC, 2008 WL 3846318, at *4-6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008)
(holding that an LLC agreement may eliminate the right to judicial dissolution).
221. See Johnson, supra note 22, at 719 (describing a similar set of factors relevant to
the exercise of equitable discretion).
222. See Carlisle, 114 A.3d at 594, 606-07 (exercising equitable discretion to order dissolution where the parties used a “simple form” LLC agreement that did not accurately reflect
the LLC parties’ intended bargain).
223. See infra note 233 and accompanying text.
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challenged conduct or circumstances; as well as whether available legal remedies would be adequate.224 How these factors weigh in any
given case is necessarily context specific.225
But one factor that must be weighed in every case is the central
importance of certainty and determinacy in business relationships
generally 226 and LLCs in particular. 227 To the extent the courts exercise their constitutionally protected equitable power to override the
express terms of a particular LLC agreement, the courts undercut the
ability of all parties to rely on such agreements. Such uncertainty complicates business planning and promotes costly litigation. 228 It risks
undermining parties’ bargained-for risk allocation and the contractual
and extra-contractual mechanisms upon which that allocation was
based.229 Put differently, even putting aside Delaware’s statutory mandate, the freedom of contract and the enforceability of bargained-for
224. See, e.g., Huatuco, 2013 WL 6460898, at *6 (denying petition for judicial dissolution
where the plaintiff may have an adequate legal remedy in a suit for breach of contract); see
also infra notes 259-64 and accompanying text.
225. See Johnson, supra note 22, at 719 (“This [equitable] analysis will, as always, require the weighing of several factors and, ultimately, demands the exercise of judgment [by
the court] . . . .”).
226. See e.g., Johnson, supra note 22, at 721 (“A stronger case for [fiduciary] waivers
would focus on the desirability of greater certainty and determinacy in intra-firm
relations . . . .”); Id. at 719 (arguing that courts must exercise equitable discretion “with mindfulness being given not only to the interest of the parties before the court but also to the
ramifications for business dealings more generally”); see also Bainbridge, supra note 28, at
514 (“[C]orporate law’s main goals ought to be certainty and predictability. Uncertainty about
the contours and content of a legal rule imposes substantial costs.” (footnote omitted)); Ehud
Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L.
R. 1908, 1919 (1998) (emphasizing the importance of determinacy in corporate law).
227. See R & R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, No. 3803-CC, 2008
WL 3846318, at *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008) (Chandler, C.) (“The allure of the [LLC], however,
would be eviscerated if the parties could simply petition this court to renegotiate their agreements when relationships sour.”); Haley v. Talcott, 864 A.2d 86, 88 (Del. Ch. 2004) (Strine,
V.C.) (“A principle attraction of the LLC form of entity is the statutory freedom granted to
members to shape, by contract, their own approach to common business ‘relationship’ problems.”); Manesh, Market for LLC Law, supra note 2, 226-34 (arguing that a principal
advantage of LLC law is that freedom of contract enables LLCs to avoid the costs and uncertainty associated with indeterminate principles of fiduciary duty); cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 78 (criticizing the doctrine of LLC veil
piercing for creating “only uncertainty and lack of predictability, thus increasing transaction
costs for small businesses”).
228. See Manesh, Legal Asymmetry, supra note 53, at 503; cf. Steele, supra note 171, at
241 (arguing that the judicial imposition of fiduciary duties in LLCs increases litigation costs).
229. See Suren Gomstian, Contractual Mechanisms of Investor Protection in Non-Listed
Limited Liability Companies, 60 VILL. L. REV. 955, 957 (2015) (providing evidence that participants in privately held LLCs utilize contractual substitutes in lieu of statutory default
rules, such as fiduciary duties, to ensure equivalent protection of investors); John Goodgame,
Master Limited Partnership Governance, 60 BUS. LAW. 471, 474-79 (2005) (identifying various contractual “obligations and incentives likely [to] promote proper management” of a
publicly traded limited partnership); Manesh, Contractual Freedom, supra note 53, at 597
n.229 (acknowledging that beyond the express terms of the governing agreement “capital,
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agreements are intrinsically important values that must be considered
in any equitable analysis.
Delaware courts have routinely cited the vital importance of certainty and determinacy in express contractual obligations when
rejecting claims based on the implied contractual covenant of good
faith and fair dealing230—a contract law doctrine that affords courts
room to exercise equitable discretion 231 and, like the courts’ equity jurisdiction, cannot be waived by the terms of an LLC agreement. 232 For
product, and labor markets (although not the market for control) may play an important role
in incentivizing and holding alternative entity managers accountable”); Larry E. Ribstein,
Partnership Governance of Large Firms, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 289, 290-98 (2009) [hereinafter
Ribstein, Partnership Governance] (identifying various contractual and extra-contractual
mechanisms that provide managerial accountability in large unincorporated firms in lieu of
fiduciary duties); Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 537, 546-47 (1997) (same). But see Peter Molk, How Do LLC Owners
Contract Around Default Statutory Protections?, 42 J. CORP. L. 503, 503 (2017) (finding “little
evidence . . . that the contractual freedom is used to craft systematically more efficient contractual owner protections,” but instead that “LLCs with more vulnerable owners adopt
significantly fewer owner safeguards, suggesting that contractual freedom may be used more
often for opportunism and not for efficiency”).
230. See Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1126 (Del. 2010) (“[W]e must . . . not rewrite
the contract to appease a party who later wishes to rewrite a contract he now believes to
have been a bad deal.”); id. at 1128 (“Crafting . . . a post contracting equitable amendment
that shifts economic benefits from [one contracting party to the other] would vitiate the limited reach of the [implied covenant].”); Dunlap v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 878 A.2d 434,
441 (Del. 2005) (“Existing contract terms control . . . such that implied good faith cannot be
used to circumvent the parties’ bargain . . . .”); ASB Allegiance Real Estate Fund v. Scion
Breckenridge Manager Member, LLC, No. 5843–VCL, 2012 WL 1869416, at *19 (Del. Ch.
May 16, 2012) (Laster, V.C.) (“The [implied covenant] should not be used to ‘rewrite the contract’ that a party now regards as ‘a bad deal.’ ” (quoting Nemec, 991 A.2d at 1126)); Winshall
v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 55 A.3d 629, 637 (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 2011) (Strine, C.) (“[T]he implied
covenant is not a license to rewrite contractual language just because the plaintiff failed to
negotiate for [better] protections . . . .”); Lonergan v. EPE Holdings, LLC, 5 A.3d 1008, 1025
(Del. Ch. 2010) (Laster, V.C.) (“[B]ecause the LP Act specifically authorizes the elimination
of fiduciary duties, this Court must act with ‘caution and restraint’ and decline to use the
implied covenant as a basis for ‘ignoring the clear language’ of Section 1101(d) and the Holdings LP Agreement.” (quoting Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 87 (Del. 1992))); Related Westpac
LLC v. JER Snowmass LLC, No. 5001–VCS, 2010 WL 2929708, at *6 (Del. Ch. July 23, 2010)
(Strine, V.C.) (“[Plaintiff] seeks for me to imply a condition . . . that was expressly excluded
by the terms of the contract! Delaware Law respects the freedom of parties in commerce to
strike bargains . . . and enforces those bargains as plainly written.”); Frontier Oil Corp. v.
Holly Corp., No. Civ.A. 20502, 2005 WL 1039027, at *28 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005) (Noble,
V.C.) (“The Court, of course, may not substitute its notions of fairness for the terms of the
agreement reached by the parties.”); see also Klig v. Deloitte LLP, 36 A.3d 785, 797 (Del. Ch.
2011) (Laster, V.C.) (“[The implied covenant] does not empower the Court to impose on the
parties its own view of what would be fair or reasonable.”); cf. Strine & Laster, supra note
233, at 26 (“[T]he potential expansion in the role of the implied covenant could render contractual expectations less predictable, thereby raising the cost of contracting and deterring
the formation of some relationships.”).
231. See Manesh, Express Terms, supra note 187, 32-38 (describing the equitable discretion involved in applying the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
232. See id. at 3; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2016) (prohibiting waiver
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in LLC agreements); id. § 17-1101(d)
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the same reasons, Delaware courts are right to be exceedingly wary to
deploy their constitutionally protected equitable powers to override
the express terms of an LLC agreement. Consequently, the judicial use
of that power may be limited to cases where the circumstances presented, although perhaps contemplated in general terms, are not
specifically and explicitly addressed by the LLC agreement, and therefore, the express contractual right or obligation at issue is itself not
fully determinate. 233
(prohibiting waiver of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in limited partnership agreements); id. § 15-103(f) (prohibiting waiver of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in general partnership agreements).
233. Both Haley and Carlisle fit this criterion. In Haley, although the LLC agreement
provided for a detailed exit mechanism in the event a member desired to leave the business,
the detailed provisions did not specifically address the unusual facts of the case, namely
what should happen where the member wishing to exit is also a bound by a personal guaranty to a third party on behalf of the business. See Haley v. Talcott, 864 A.2d 86, 92 (Del.
Ch. 2004). Likewise, in Carlisle, although the LLC statute did not grant standing to the LLC
interest assignee to seek judicial dissolution, neither the statutory provision nor the simple
form LLC agreement used by the parties specifically addressed the unusual facts of that
case, namely what should happen where, due to the parties’ informality, neither the assignee
nor assignor qualified as a member and were, therefore, left powerless in the business’s governance contrary to the parties’ original expectations. See In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC, 114
A.3d 592, 606 (Del. Ch. 2015).
Applying this criterion to limit equitable intervention to only those cases where the
relevant statutory or contract provisions do not specifically and explicitly address the circumstances presented is consistent with the suggestion that equity acts a ‘gap-filler’ where
the parties’ agreement is otherwise silent. See, e.g., Jowers & Adams, supra note 122, at 1,
4. In this respect, to the extent the courts limit the exercise of their equitable powers to only
cases where the relevant statutory or contract text is silent to the specific circumstances
presented, the role of equity will be akin to the role of the implied contractual covenant of
good faith and fair dealing which is likewise a judicial gap-filler. See Manesh, Express
Terms, supra note 187, at 20-43. The difference will be that the courts can be more explicit
about considerations of fairness and justice, and therefore more aggressive, when exercising
their equitable powers. Cf. Leo E. Strine, Jr., & J. Travis Laster, The Siren Song of Unlimited
Contractual Freedom in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND ALTERNATIVE
FORMS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 11, 25-27 (Robert W. Hillman & Mark J. Loewenstein
eds., 2015) (expressing concern that in the face of fiduciary waivers courts may be tempted
to bend the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing to achieve justice in
particularly egregious cases).
In identifying gaps in an LLC agreement, courts are aided by two doctrines. The
first is the doctrine of contra proferentem, interpreting ambiguous provisions of an LLC
agreement against the drafting party, often the manager or controlling member of the LLC.
Cf. Norton v. K-Sea Transp. Partners, L.P., 67 A.3d 354, 360 (Del. 2013) (“If the contractual
language at issue is ambiguous and if the limited partners did not negotiate for the agreement’s terms, we apply the contra proferentem principle . . . .”); In re Nantucket Island
Assocs. Ltd. P’ship Unitholders Litig., 810 A.2d 351, 361 (Del. Ch. 2002) (Strine, V.C.) (applying contra proferentem to interpret ambiguity in a limited partnership agreement
“drafted almost exclusively by the[] founding general partners—or perhaps more accurately,
by the lawyers for the[] founding general partners”). The second is the principle that any
contractual waiver of fiduciary duties must be explicit and unambiguous. See, e.g., Feeley v.
NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 664 (Del. Ch. 2012) (Laster, V.C.) (“Drafters of an LLC agreement ‘must make their intent to eliminate fiduciary duties plain and unambiguous.’ ”
(quoting Bay Ctr. Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, No. 3658-VCS, 2009 WL
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Related to the importance of certainty in business law, there is a
second, more pragmatic reason to believe the chancery court will exercise its constitutional equity jurisdiction sparingly, in only the most
exceptional, compelling cases. Delaware, as a state, draws enormous—and growing—revenues due to its popularity as the legal home
to hundreds of thousands of LLCs. 234 And over the last decade, while
the percentage of the state’s annual revenue derived from corporate
franchise taxes has been flat, an increasingly larger portion of the
state’s annual revenue has been derived from the taxes paid by LLCs
organized in Delaware. 235
Business planners and their attorneys nationally are drawn to Delaware’s LLC law principally because of the perceived certainty and
contractual freedom it affords, including the freedom to modify or eliminate fiduciary duties. 236 If the chancery court were to routinely use its
constitutionally protected equitable power to override the express
terms of LLC agreements in anything other than the most exceptional
and compelling circumstances, then it would undermine this key attraction of the state and jeopardize Delaware’s lucrative LLC tax base.
Even if Delaware’s judges are insensitive to this fact, Delaware’s
political actors will undoubtedly be more pragmatically minded. 237 And
while exercising equitable discretion is a judicial question, amending
the state constitution to strip the courts of that discretion is a political
question that can be decided on purely pragmatic considerations.238
Mindful that their constitutional power to do equity will be jeopardized
by the imprudent use of that power, Delaware jurists are likely to limit

1124451, at *9 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009) (Strine, V.C.))); Paige Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Lerner
Master Fund, LLC, No. 5502-C5, 2011 WL 3505355, at *31 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 2011) (Strine,
C.) (“Although Delaware’s [LP statute] permits the waiver of fiduciary duties, such waivers
must be set forth clearly . . . .”); Kelly v. Blum, No. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *10 n.70
(Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2010) (Parsons, V.C.) (“Having been granted great contractual freedom by
the LLC Act, drafters of and parties to an LLC agreement should be expected to provide . . .
clear and unambiguous provisions when they desire to expand, restrict, or eliminate the operation of traditional fiduciary duties.”); Sonet v. Timber Co., L.P., 722 A.2d 319, 322 (Del.
Ch. 1998) (Chandler, C.) (“[P]rinciples of contract preempt fiduciary principles where the
parties to a limited partnership have made their intentions to do so plain.”).
234. See Manesh, Market for LLC Law, supra note 2, at 200-04.
235. See id. at 197-204.
236. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Why Delaware LLCs?, 91 OR. L. REV. 57, 105 (2012) (reporting the results of interviews with business attorneys about their preference for Delaware
LLC law); see also supra note 227.
237. See Manesh, Damning Dictum, supra note 144, at 67 (citing other examples of the
Delaware legislature’s alacrity to promptly correct problematic judicial precedents).
238. The Delaware state constitution may be modified in one of two ways, both of which can
be initiated solely by the Delaware General Assembly. See Johnson, supra note 22, at 714 n.70.
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the use of equity to override contract to only the most compelling circumstances. Despite Carlisle, cases like Haley will be exceptional, not
the rule in LLC jurisprudence. 239

B. Publicly Traded LLCs and Limited Partnerships
Even if Delaware courts are appropriately reluctant to exercise
their constitutionally protected equitable powers to override the express terms of an LLC agreement, publicly traded LLCs, and their
limited partnership ilk, could prove to be a special exception. The vast
majority of publicly traded businesses are organized as corporations,
in which, as noted above, investors are protected by the unwaivable
fiduciary duties owed by corporate officers and directors. 240 But some
150 publicly traded businesses are unincorporated 241—LLCs or, more
commonly, limited partnerships—almost always organized under
Delaware law. 242
Delaware limited partnership law is in many respects identical to
its LLC law. 243 In fact, Delaware’s LLC statute was modeled on the
state’s limited partnership statute, 244 including its express commitment to the “freedom of contract.” 245 Exercising this freedom, the
agreements governing publicly traded LLCs and limited partnerships
commonly contain terms eliminating the fiduciary duty of loyalty, replacing that equitable duty with less rigorous contractual
obligations.246 And in deference to the statutorily mandated freedom of
239. See, e.g., Trusa v. Nepo, No. CV 12071-VCMR, 2017 WL 1379594, at *8 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 13, 2017) (Montgomery-Reeves, V.C.) (asserting that the equitable power recognized in
Carlisle is an “extreme” measure “that should be granted sparingly”). Note, in many circumstances, the Delaware courts may achieve equitable results without even appealing to their
constitutional equitable powers. The courts might rely instead on established contract law
doctrines of contra proferentem or the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See
supra note 233.
240. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
241. See Master Limited Partnership Association, List of Current MLPs & MLP Funds
(2016), http://www.mlpassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/MLP-LIST.pdf.
242. See Manesh, Contractual Freedom, supra note 53, at 598 n.236.
243. See Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 290-92 (Del. 1999) (comparing
the similarities between the Delaware LLC and limited partnership statutes); Bay Ctr. Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, No. 3658-VCS, 2009 WL 1124451, at *9 n. 43
(Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009) (Strine, V.C.) (“[I]n the absence of developed LLC case law, this court
has often decided LLC cases by looking to analogous provisions in limited partnership law.”).
244. See Elf Atochem, 727 A.2d at 290 (“The Delaware [LLC] Act has been modeled on the
popular Delaware [Limited Partnership] Act. In fact, its architecture and much of its wording
is almost identical to that of the Delaware [Limited Partnership] Act. Under the [LLC] Act, a
member of an LLC is treated much like a limited partner . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
245. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(c) (2016).
246. See Manesh, Contractual Freedom, supra note 53, at 574-96 (reporting empirical
evidence showing that 88% of publicly traded LLCs and limited partnerships fully eliminate or exculpate the fiduciary duties of their managers); Strine & Laster, supra note 233,
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contract, Delaware courts have, in case after case, enforced these
agreements, dismissing lawsuits brought by public investors alleging
bad faith or self-dealing on the part of the parties managing or controlling the business.247
In enforcing contractual fiduciary waivers in the context of a publicly traded LLC or limited partnership, however, the courts have
sometimes paused to observe the inequity of the situation.248 After all,
the agreements governing these businesses bear all the hallmarks of
contracts of adhesion: prolix and confusing, often unread and unnegotiated, offered on a take-it-or-leave it basis, and frequently stuffed full
of terms that favor the drafting party (the firm’s managers and sponsors) at the expense of sometimes unsophisticated public investors.249
Thus, in Encore Energy, for instance, after finding the “near absence
under the [LP agreement] of any duties whatsoever [owed] to [the]
public equity holders,” Vice Chancellor Parsons observed in dictum
that “[i]nvestors apprehensive about the risks inherent in waiving the
fiduciary duties of those with whom they entrust their investments
may be well advised to avoid [publicly traded] limited partnerships.”250
And on appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court likewise cautioned public
investors “seek[ing] the protections the common law duties of loyalty

at 12 (observing, from a judicial perspective, that “[a]mong the hallmarks of these agreements [governing publicly traded LLCs and limited partnerships] are broad waivers of all
fiduciary duties”).
247. See, e.g., Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 139 (Del. 2008); Dieckman v. Regency GP
LP, No. 11130-CB, 2016 WL 1223348 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2016); In re Kinder Morgan, Inc.
Corp. Reorg. Litig., No. 10093-VCL, 2015 WL 4975270 (Del. Ch. Aug. 20, 2015), aff’d, No.
515, 2015, 2016 WL 912184 (Del. Mar. 10, 2016); Gerber v. EPE Holdings, LLC, No. 3543VCN, 2013 WL 209658 (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 2013); In re Encore Energy Partners LP Unitholder
Litig., No. 6347-VCP, 2012 WL 3792997 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2012), aff’d, 72 A.3d 93 (Del.
2013); In re K-Sea Transp. Partners L.P. Unitholders Litig., No. 6301-VCP, 2012 WL
1142351 (Del. Ch. Apr. 4, 2012), aff’d, 67 A.3d 354, 360-61 (Del. 2013); Brinckerhoff v.
Enbridge Energy Co., Inc., No. 5526-VCN, 2011 WL 4599654 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011), aff’d,
67 A.3d 369 (Del. 2013).
248. See, e.g., Dieckman, 2016 WL 1223348, at *11 (Bouchard, C.) (“I recognize it may
seem harsh to shield a conflicted transaction from judicial review . . . without requiring the
disclosure of all material information.”); Gerber v. EPE Holdings, LLC, No. 3543-VCN, 2013
WL 209658, at *10 (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 2013) (Noble, V.C.) (“It is not difficult to understand
[the plaintiff-investor’s] skepticism and frustration, but his real problem is the contract that
binds him and his fellow limited partners.”); Gerber v. Enter. Prods. Holdings, LLC, No.
5989-VCN, 2012 WL 34442, at *13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2012) (Noble, V.C.) (“The facts of this
case take the reader and the writer to the outer reaches of conduct allowable under [Delaware law]. It is easy to be troubled by the allegations.”).
249. See Strine & Laster, supra note 233, at 11-13; see also Manesh, Legal Asymmetry,
supra note 53, at 482-84 (questioning the assumptions underlying the contractual conception
of LLCs and limited partnerships for publicly traded firms).
250. In re Encore Energy Partners LP Unitholder Litig., No. 6347–VCP, 2012 WL
3792997, at *13 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2012) (Parsons, V.C.).
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and care provide . . . to invest in a Delaware corporation” rather than
an LLC or limited partnership.251
Sounding their own skepticism about the freedom of contract as applied to publicly traded LLCs and limited partnerships, Chief Justice
Strine joined by Vice Chancellor Laster, in a recently co-authored book
chapter,252 have bemoaned the ability of these businesses to contractually eliminate all fiduciary obligations that would otherwise be owed
to public investors. 253 To address this problem, the two jurists have
proposed amending Delaware’s alternative entity statutes to make the
fiduciary duty of loyalty mandatory—contractually unwaivable—for
publicly traded LLCs and limited partnerships.254
But the upshot of Carlisle is that the Delaware Chancery Court already possesses the constitutional power to enforce the fiduciary duty
of loyalty notwithstanding the express terms of an agreement purporting to waive that duty. 255 While an amendment to Delaware’s statutes
would lend the courts the legislature’s imprimatur, under the reasoning of Carlisle, such an amendment is unnecessary as a strictly
constitutional matter.
To be sure, the chancery court’s assertion of its constitutional power
to override the statutorily mandated freedom of contract risks a confrontation between the state judiciary and the Delaware General
Assembly. As noted above, the state’s pragmatically minded legislators will be sensitive to any judicial decision that potentially imperils
the state’s thriving LLC and limited partnership tax base. 256 But, in
the narrow context of publicly traded LLCs and limited partnerships,
the legislature might be less concerned by the courts’ assertion of equity to override the express terms of an agreement. Because the vast
majority of Delaware LLCs and limited partnerships are privately
held, the approximately 150 publicly traded unincorporated businesses represent only a very small slice of Delaware’s alternative
entity tax base. 257 Together, these publicly traded unincorporated businesses contribute approximately $45,000 (or less than 0.0002%) of

251. Allen v. Encore Energy Partners, LP, 72 A.3d 93, 109 (Del. 2013).
252. See generally Strine & Laster, supra note 233.
253. See id. at 11-13.
254. See Strine & Laster, supra note 233, at 13 (proposing that “[f]or publicly traded
entities, the duty of loyalty would be non-waivable”).
255. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text.
257. See Manesh, Contractual Freedom, supra note 53, at 571-72. For scale, consider
that, in 2014 alone, 121,592 LLCs and 9,721 limited partnerships were formed in Delaware.
See JEFFREY W. BULLOCK, DEL. DIV. OF CORPS., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2015),
https://corp.delaware.gov/Corporations_2014%20Annual%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8EZ-WHBV].
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Delaware’s nearly $244.4 million received in annual taxes from its domestic LLCs and limited partnerships. 258 As a result, judicial rulings
that are perceived to adversely affect only Delaware’s publicly traded
LLCs and limited partnerships are less likely to raise the ire of the
state’s General Assembly.
Note, however, that even in the narrow context of publicly traded
LLCs and limited partnerships, there are reasons the chancery court
ought to be reluctant in asserting its equitable power over the express terms of the firm’s governing agreement. For one, equitable
power should be deployed only where a litigant lacks an adequate
remedy at law. 259 The public investors of an LLC or limited partnership might well have adequate options for legal redress, even in the
face of a governing agreement unilaterally drafted to be protective
of those managing or otherwise in control of the business. 260 An adequate remedy at law—namely money damages—might arise from a
claim for breach of the express terms of that agreement. 261 Even
where there is no breach of the express contract terms, an adequate
legal remedy might arise from a claim for breach of the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 262 which is implied

258. Domestic LLCs and limited partnerships—whether publicly traded or privately
held, and regardless of profits, revenue or size—pay Delaware an annual flat tax of $300 for
the simple privilege of being organized under Delaware law. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit.
6, § 18-1107(b) (2016) (LLCs); id. § 17-1109(a) (limited partnerships). In 2015, Delaware received in total $244.4 million in annual taxes from its domestic LLCs and limited
partnerships. See DEL. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FINANCIAL SUMMARY: GOVERNOR’S
RECOMMENDED BUDGET: FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 8 (2016), http://budget.delaware.gov/
budget/fy2017/documents/operating/vol1/financial-summary.pdf. For an analysis of Delaware’s flat tax structure for LLCs and limited partnerships, see generally Manesh, Market
for LLC Law, supra note 2, at 204-10.
259. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (explaining this principle of
equity jurisprudence).
260. See, e.g., In re Atlas Energy Res., LLC, No. 4589-VCN, 2010 WL 4273122, at *8
(Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010) (ruling that a contractual provision waiving all conflicts of interest
between the LLC and its controlling unitholder does not waive the duty of loyalty as it applies to a conflict of interests between the controlling unitholder and the LLC’s minority
unitholders); Kahn v. Portnoy, No. 3515-CC, 2008 WL 5197164, at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2008)
(ruling that a contractual provision waiving all conflicts of interests between the LLC’s managers and its unitholders does not waive the duty of loyalty as it applies to a conflict of
interests between the LLC’s managers and the LLC itself).
261. See, e.g., In re El Paso Pipeline Partners, No. 7141-VCL, 2015 WL 1815846, at *27
(Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2015) (awarding judgment for damages against general partner for breach
of express contractual duty).
262. See, e.g., Gerber v. Enter. Products Holdings, LLC, 67 A.3d 400, 425 (Del. 2013)
(holding that plaintiff-investor stated a valid claim based on the implied contractual covenant against the managers of a publicly traded limited partnership).
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into every contract 263 and unwaivable under both LLC and limited
partnership statutes. 264
Importantly, however, a party does not have an adequate legal remedy simply because that party could have better protected itself ex ante
in the terms of the LLC or limited partnership agreement. 265 To be
sure, a party’s voluntary assent to an agreement that leaves that party
vulnerable to later actions that were reasonably foreseeable and could
have easily be contractually proscribed ex ante weighs against the
court’s use of equitable discretion to protect that party ex post facto.
Equity protects the vigilant, after all. 266 But the fact that a party failed
to protect herself ex ante alone cannot mean that the party has an adequate remedy at law; otherwise, equity would have virtually no role to
play in the world of business associations, where the relationships between the entity, its investors, and managers are created by consent,
and the parties arguably always possess the ability to protect themselves ex ante.267
A second reason that courts should be chary to equitably intervene
in the context of publicly traded LLCs and limited partnerships is that
various market-based considerations associated with these entities
weigh against the judicial use of equitable discretion to protect investors. For example, even if the agreements governing publicly traded
LLCs and limited partnerships are prolix and confusing, public investors benefit under federal securities law from extensive and explicit
disclosures of the business and legal risks involved. 268 And the securities purchased by these investors have been priced by a liquid market
that is at least to some degree efficient, meaning that the terms of the
263. See supra note 187; see also supra note 233 (comparing judicial application of the
implied contractual covenant versus equity).
264. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2016) (governing limited partnerships);
id. § 18-1101(c) (governing LLCs).
265. But see CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 1037, 1046 (Del. 2011) (asserting that because
the plaintiff “could have negotiated a contractual remedy at law” but did not, the plaintiff
“has ample remedy at law”).
266. POMEROY, supra note 1, § 418, at 169. Although this maxim of equity is ordinarily
used to mean that equity will not aid those who have slept on their rights in pursuing a valid
claim, it can be generalized to support the proposition that equity will not reward those who
were slothful or negligent in protecting themselves.
267. Consider, for example, Haley v. Talcott, 864 A.2d 86, 98 (Del. Ch. 2004), where thenVice Chancellor Strine granted judicial dissolution because the “detailed exit” mechanism
contemplated by the relevant LLC agreement “fails as an adequate remedy for Haley because
it does not equitably effect the separation of the parties.”
268. See, e.g., STEPHON J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
ANALYSIS, 89-99, 191-93 (Thompson & Foundation Press eds., 2d ed. 2008) (describing the mandatory disclosures required for public offerings of securities as well as from companies with
publicly traded securities); cf. Dieckman v. Regency GP LP, No. 11130-CB, 2016 WL 1223348,
at *11 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2016) (observing that plaintiffs may have legal recourse under federal
securities law); Lonergan v. EPE Holdings, LLC, 5 A.3d 1008, 1025 (Del. Ch. 2010) (same).
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governing agreement—whether management- or investor-friendly—
have already been priced into the securities that the investors
bought. 269 As a result, even if the investors in publicly traded LLC and
limited partnership do not read or understand the unilaterally drafted
terms that they are agreeing to by investing, and even if those terms
are unduly favorable to the business’s managers and controllers, the
market ensures that the public investors are getting exactly what they
pay for. Indeed, given the sensitivity to markets and pricing, some evidence suggests that publicly traded LLCs and limited partnerships do
not simply eliminate fiduciary duties, but replace fiduciary duties with
contract- and market-based alternatives that aim to appropriately incentivize managers and protect outside investors.270
In light of these considerations, equitable intervention on behalf
of investors in publicly traded LLCs and limited partnerships risks
unfairly giving those investors more than the benefit of their bargain. 271 Thus, even in the narrow context of publicly traded
unincorporated firms, the circumstances for the court to assert equity
over the express terms of the governing agreement must be exceptional. The challenged conduct must be something that, although
perhaps contemplated in general terms, is not specifically and explicitly permitted by the agreement governing the firm; 272 and, moreover,
the conduct must be so peculiar, outrageous, or otherwise unforeseeable that it is doubtful the market could have priced the risk of such
conduct into the value of the securities.

269. See, e.g., CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 268, at 28-29 (describing the efficient capital market hypothesis); cf. Gerber v. Enter. Products Holdings, No. 5989-VCN, LLC, 2012
WL 34442, at *10 n.42 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2012) (Noble, V.C.) (observing that “[i]f the protection
provided by Delaware law is scant, then the. . . units of these [publicly traded] partnerships
might trade at a discount”).
270. See Suren Gomtsian, The Governance of Publicly Traded Limited Liability Companies,
40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 207, 225-69 (2015) (providing evidence of various contractual and non-contractual mechanisms protective of minority holders in publicly traded LLCs); cf. supra note 229.
271. To be sure, it may be the case that since the time of Carlisle the possibility of equitable intervention has been priced into the publicly traded securities of LLCs and LPs and,
therefore, the price paid by subsequent purchasers of such securities has already factored in
this potential. But cases like Carlisle may be rare enough (and, indeed, there has not yet
been an analogous example in the context of publicly traded LLCs and LPs) that the market
may not have yet priced it. Even if Delaware courts decide more cases along of the lines of
Carlisle, asserting the courts’ equitable power notwithstanding the express terms of a firm’s
governing agreement, and even if those cases involve a publicly traded LLC and LP, the facts
and the terms at issue in any given case may be idiosyncratic enough that the market will
not price such decisions into shares of other publicly traded LLCs and LPs. Manesh, Market
for LLC Law, supra note 2, at 235-38 (discussing how the contractibility permitted under
LLC law limits the network effects of judicial precedents).
272. See supra notes 221-25 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The lasting impact of Carlisle ultimately rests on how the Delaware courts approach its conflict with Bax and the constitutional role
of equity in LLCs. As this Article has argued, Bax’s flawed understanding of equity, 273 coupled with recent developments involving
Delaware’s LLC statute and judiciary, 274 suggest that Bax’s future
precedential value is not promising.
If Carlisle is indeed vindicated, then it portends a resurgent role
for equity—and a fundamental crack in the seemingly solid contractlaw foundations of LLCs. In practice, the consequences will be subtle, but far-reaching. Because under Delaware’s unusual
constitutional framework, equity cannot be subordinated by statute
or contract. Only a state constitutional amendment can subordinate
the judicial power to “to do right and justice.” 275

273. See supra Section IV.A.
274. See supra Section IV.B.
275. In theory at least, an alternative route to subordinating equity to contract would be
to overrule the Delaware Supreme Court’s interpretation of the state constitution in Dupont.
See supra note 72-76 and accompanying text. Given that this interpretation has been repeatedly reaffirmed, most recently in both Bax and Carlisle, however, a reversal of Dupont seems
improbable. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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